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Chapter one: How should physicians be motivatedtofulfill social obligations?
Health, or at least freedom from acute or chronic pain, disability, or disease, is a
condition of human flourishing. Human beings cannot attain their fullest potential
without some significant measure of health. A good society is one in which each citizen
is enabled to flourish, grow, and develop as a human being.
-Edmund Pellegrino (1999, 259)
Health is instrumental to the ability of individualsto fulfill their potential. The societal
systems designed to nurture health are thereby particularly important both for the flourishing of
the individual and that of society, for a society flourishes to the extent that each of its individual
members flourishes. The medical professionalswho strive to preserve good health in their
communities through these systems are integral to the maintenance of a thriving society. They
are the individuals most directly responsible for the quality of health care available to community
members. It is their medical prowess and critical thinking skills that determine the effective
elimination of disease through innovative treatment. Yet their contributionsto healthy
communities extend beyond their evident contractual relationships with patients.
The commitment of medical professionalsto engage in promoting health beyond their

contractualresponsibilitiesis key to the quality of health care vital to a flourishing society.
Many physicians as medical professionals embrace these social responsibilitiesby voluntarily
providing indigent care, engaging in clinical research, training the next generation of physicians
and leading public health projects, to name a few examples. As this thesis will explore, their noncontractual interactions are critical to the quality of health care provided in this country and
contribute to the formation and maintenance of a society in which members enjoy a high
standard of well-being.
Furthermore, these non-contractualinteractions may be even more pivotal in a capitalistic
society where issues of health care access are distributed based on ability to pay. In such a

society, a significant number of uninsured individuals means that these community members
receive health care to·the extent that physicians and hospitals are willing to provide the care free
of charge. In addition, though the care of individuals under public health insurance such as
Medicare and Medicaid is more constant than for the uninsured, medical professionals and
hospitals often treat these patients at a financial loss because government insurance rates do not
cover the economic costs of the care provided. The commitment of some medical professionals
to treat patients regardless of low or no reimbursement is critical to health care access for this
population under the current social structure.
Examples of such publicly minded physicians abound in health care practice as well as in
other health-related areas such as clinical research, education, ethics and public health. The
volunteer physicians at Crossover Ministry, a free clinic in Richmond, Virginia, are a case in
point. Crossover Ministry has been providing health care for uninsured persons in need for over
fifteen years. It is sustained by the financial support of the community and the labor of volunteer
medical professionals. Over three hundred volunteers staff Crossover Ministry, including over
two hundred medical professionals who see patients. These medical professionals consist of
dental hygienists and dentists, nurses and nurse practitioners, physician assistants and over one
hundred physicians. CrossOver Ministry is representative of many free clinics nationwide that
utilize the voluntary services of medical professionals to help solve the problem of poor health
care access.
There are well over one thousand free clinics in the United States like Crossover
Ministry that are providing free care to the indigent (Geller et al., 2004, 48). Such free clinics are
"private, nonprofit, community or faith-based organizations that provide medical, dental, and
mental health care and prescription medications at little or no charge to low-income, working

people" (Connally, 2004, Al 7). The care these clinics offer benefits some of the estimated 43.6
million Americans who are without health insurance (Geller et al., 2004, 48). As researchers
studying free clinics in the Midwest have concluded,we "should recognizethe important role
that free clinics are playing in helping to patch the health care safety net" (Geller et al., 2004, 4950). The voluntary medical services provided by physiciansat these free clinics play a pivotal
role in alleviating health care access issues.
Though 68% of doctors in a 2004-2005 study indicatedthat they provide some free or
discountedcare to patients of low socio-economicstatus, this number is down from 76%
do<?umented.
ten years previous (Connolly, 2006, A09). High medical school debt, busy
schedules and lower reimbursementsfor services have all contributedto this decline in charity
care (Connolly, 2006, A09). To compound the problem, as the percentage of physicians offering
charity care has declined, the number of uninsuredpeople in the United States has climbed to
45.5 million in 2004 (Connolly, 2006, A09). In a country without a universal health care policy,
access to health care for these 45.5 million uninsured is dependent upon the free or discounted
care provided by physiciansand hospitals. Though the number of physiciansengaging in social
responsibilitieshas declined, there are still many-physicianschoosing to provide charity care
despite these factors.
The actions of these physicianswho consistentlyvolunteer their medical services raise
questions about the duties of physicians. Are physiciansonly responsible for elevating health in
the context of the contractual physician-patientrelationship? Is there a boundarybetween a
physician's patients and the rest of the community? And with respect to motivation,what should
inspire these physicians to work beyond the boundariesof their patients in contributingto quality
health care?

Contractual versus non-contractual obligations
The contractual physician-patient relationship, in many ways fundamental to the delivery
of effective health care and the well-being of communities, is the focus of much academic
writing in medicine. Scholars have debated the best model for this dyadic relationship, criticizing
the extreme of a purely contractual/autonomy approach on the one hand to the extreme of a
traditional, medical paternalism approach on the other (James, 1989, 142). Newer models such as
the friendship model have attempted to strike a balance between these two extremes (James,
1989, 142). The friendship model emphasizes the friendship between a physician and patient that
is a consequence of a shared activity, namely the "joint participation in a search for the truth" in
the case of preserving health (James, 1989, 144). The friendship model also stresses "the moral
equality of the parties" as well as the integral role of trust between physician and patient as "both
an inherent good and an instrumental good, because trust furthers the good of health" (James,
1989, 145). Common to each of these models are the special obligations that arise within the
contractual physician-patient relationship. These obligations, beyond the over-arching obligation
to promote the health and well-being of the patient, include duties the physician holds to the
patient such as well-adopted moral principles of truth-telling and promise-keeping as well as
competence (Pellegrino, 1983, 194).
While the contractual physician-patient relationship is the fundamental unit of health care
distribution, "when the contract becomes the paradigm of a moral relationship, and the market
the regnant model of a just community, much of what makes us human, and our communities
livable, is excluded" (Murray, 1994, 32). Our communities are livable and our relationships
human in large part because of the non-contractual interactions within a society, and in part
because of the broader, non-contractual interactions of physicians with their communities. As

this thesis will demonstrate,the contractualphysician-patientrelationshipis greatly enhanced by
the non-contractualresponsibilitieswhich the physicianembraces. These non-contractual
interactionsextend beyond the care of the patient to include activities that promote the public
health of the community. But how large is the scope of a communityto which a physician is
obligated?
In BeleagueredRulers, William May speaks of Aristotle's idea of the polis which was a
good community of friends or people with shared interests and goals (2003, 29). This community
was small enough to recognize all citizens by name, and to engage everyone in civic
responsibility (May, 2003, 29). May further points out that in this global age, communitiesare
widely interdependentand in today's "metropolisescomprisedof strangers," strangers connect
through cash more often than shared interests (2003, 29). Given these circumstances,how should
we define the communitiesto which physicians are socially obligated? As May points out, a
community is no longerjust a neighborhood.A communitymight mean a town, a city, a state,
the nation, or the world. For the purposes of this thesis, one might call a communityanything .
outside of the one-on-onephysician-patientrelationship.Such a definition of communityallows
the moral obligationsof a physician to be dischargedat the local level or on a larger scale. For
the purposes of this thesis, it is a broad enough definition to encompassmost viewpointswith
respect to the scope of the social responsibilitiesof physicians.
In this thesis, social obligations of physicians are defined as non-contractualinteractions
of physicians with their communities in a manner that utilizes their medical knowledge and/or
skills. Such actions might include, but are not limited to: providing health care to uninsured
patients; engaging in the collection of data for another expert's clinical research; lobbying
political organizationsor governmentabout health-relatedissues; educating community·

members about medical prevention; curb-side consultation; training the next generation of
physicians; serving on hospital review boards and ethics committees; providing emergency care;
participating in medical missions trips; promoting public health. The scope of these social
obligations ranges from the opinion that they are acts of charity to the opinion that they demand
fulfillment as forcefully as a contract with a patient demands adherence. In contrast to the
consensus on contractual obligations of physicians, there is less of a consensus regarding the
nature and extent of the social obligations of physicians to their communities. While the scope of
physicians' social obligations is debatable, most will agree that physicians do have social
obligations. Literature relating the opinions of the medical community at large further
corroborates this perspective.
The medical community perspective on non-contractual obligations of physicians
Medical schools make an effort to educate future physicians to be aware of their social
responsibilities through ethics and humanities training as well as service-learning opportunities.
Social responsibilities of physicians are addressed in the modem version of the Hippocratic Oath
which is recited by graduating medical students to this day. The Hippocratic Oath has been
described as ..a declaration of virtue based on faith and self-respect" (Marketos et al., 1996, 102).
One statement in the Oath is recited as follows: "I will remember that I remain a member of
society, with special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body as
well as the infirm" (Lasagna, 1964, 1). This statement implies that as a member of society, the
physician has special obligations to all her fellow human beings, the healthy as well as the sick.
By reciting the Hippocratic Oath, physicians are pledging themselves to uphold the
responsibilities of the medical profession as stipulated in the Oath. Much as a political official
would be bound by an oath of office, physicians ought to follow through with the promises they

make to society by taking this oath. Though the Hippocratic Oath is still commonly recited, some
critics question whether or not it is relevant to the modern-day context of medicine. Newer
versions of the Oath like the one created by Lasagna in 1964 attempt to address these concerns.

It could be argued that the Oath has become more of a tradition and less of an imperative for
today's physicians. However, given its preponderance at medical school graduation ceremonies,
it is still a good starting place for the grounds of physicians' social obligations as defined by the
medical community.
As Steven H. Miles points out in The Hippocratic Oath and the ethics of medicine, "The
Oath notably promotes the principles of beneficence and justice ... pertain[ing] to the role of the
physician as promoting health in society and engaging in matters of public health, human rights,
and harmful ecological change" (2004, 181). The social obligations of physicians to engage in
health matters beyond their relationships with their patients are not forgotten in this historical
document. During Hippocrates' life, physicians in Greek society understood ~'that the physiciancitizenship role promoted the health of the citizens of a city-state, just as clinical work promoted
the health of individuals" (Miles, 2004, 56). Thus the Greeks understood one role of medical
providers as physician-citizens. In their role as physician-citizens, "Physicians treated people
during epidemics ... [and] would have been expected to participate in public debates about the
governance of Greek society" (Miles, 2004, 56). Times have not changed so drastically as to call
into question the need for such fulfillment of social responsibilities in the context of medicine
today.
The medical community at large acknowledges social responsibilities as evidenced by the
focus of the American Medical Association, the primary, prominent professional organization for
physicians dedicated to helping doctors help patients and to improving the nation's health. The

American Medical Association's Code of MedicalEthics addressessocial obligationsof
physicians in its seventhprinciple: "A physicianshall recognizea responsibilityto participatein
activities contributingto the improvementof the communityand the bettermentof public health"
(E-1.001 Principlesof MedicalEthics). This principleindicatesthat physicianshave a duty to
participate in communityactivitiesthat are pertinentto health. However,the principledoes not
explicitly define the scope of these obligations.Others define social obligationsof physiciansas
including"advocacy for and participationin improvingthe aspects of communitiesthat affect the
health of individuals"(Gruen et al., 2004, 94). More specificallywith regard to care for the poor,
the American Medical Associationmakes it clear that each physicianhas a responsibilityto care
for the indigent in his community.Gruen et al. reiteratethat "all physicianshave a primary
ethical and professionalresponsibilityfor the health of the communitymembersthey serve"
(2004, 94). Thus while there does not appear to be a clear consensusof what physicians' social
obligationsentail, there is a consensuson the existenceof these obligations.
But beyond the historicalprecedenceof and contemporarycommitmentto these
obligations,what are the groundsof the socialresponsibilitiesof the physician?For the purposes
of this introduction,I will lay out one argumentin particular. However,in this thesis, other
arguments are addressed in the context of various ethical frameworks.

An argument/or the non-contractual obligations of physicians

A compellingargumentfor the groundingof the social obligationsof physiciansis found
in the nature of the professionscoupled with the operationof medicine in a capitalisticsociety.
First, as a profession,physiciansfall into the same category as lawyers and clergy who are
dedicated to the ends of their professio.nto the extent that they serve beyond their contractual
obligations. Literatureon the professionsplaces great emphasison ethical ideals and service to

others. For example, in The ends of human life: Medical ethics in a liberal polity, Ezekiel J.
Emanuel writes that what sets apart the professions from other occupations is the emphasis on
dedication to ethical ideals and service to the subjects for whose benefit the ideals are pursued
(1991, 14). The professional should exhibit a concern for society as a whole and care for the best

in a culture (Campbell, 1982). When an individual chooses to become a member of a profession,
he is choosing to accept the profession's ends as his own ends. More specifically,ifhe chooses
to become a physician, he is dedicating his career and knowledge towards the improvementof
the health of his community. Acceptanceof training and education from elders in the profession
is acknowledgementof a dedication not only to master the skills of the profession, but to
contribute towards the ends of the profession. Just as Donald Fleming states: "The practice of
medicine is... a treaty with society" (Crossover Ministry, 2003). Given this treaty with society,
physicians must engage in the fulfillment of social obligations in order to contribute to the ends
of the medical profession (Geiger, 1957, 89). As such, a physician dedicated to the health of her
community cannot ignore the broader responsibilitiesshe has to her community to further these
ends beyond her contractual relationshipswith her patients.
For the professional,service to others comes before the professional's gain. Consider
Plato•s Republic in which Socrates discusses the nature of a craft and specificallythe purpose of
a physician: "Tell me: Is a doctor in the precise sense... a money-maker or someone who treats
the sick? Tell me about the one who is really a doctor" (Plato, 1992, 341c). Thrasymachus
responds, "He's the one who treats the sick" (Plato, 1992, 341c). A craft's end, according to
Socrates, is to provide what is advantageousto that craft (see chapter three of this thesis for an
extended discussion). In other words, physicians are specificallypoised to provide medical
assistance, and thus the ends of the craft ought to focus on the needs of the people to whom

physicians are providing assistance.Likewise with other professions,those who are really
professionals place the importanceof service to those receiving assistancebefore the importance
of money-making.With these common values, lawyers, clergy, physiciansand other
professionalsmust, and many do, recognize the social responsibilitiestied to their profession.
Those in the medical field must recognize the instrumentalvalue of fulfilling social
obligations in making the ends of the medical professiontheir own ends. As Emanuel puts it with
regards to the public health profession,"the public health professional's client is the general
public and his primary end is promotinghealth of the general community"( 1991, 16). The
physician who is serving in the role of a public health professionalmust hold the health of the
general communityas a primary goal. As Burns states in his book entitled Leadership,
"Leadership, unlike naked power-wielding,is thus inseparablefrom followers' needs and goals"
( 1978, 19). The physician's exercise of leadershipin society, rather than highlightingthe
selective use of medical knowledge and skills, must be focused on the health needs of the
community being served.
Secondly,physicianshave social obligationsparticularlyin the context of health care
provision in a capitalisticeconomy. Medicine as a social good operates under conditionsof
scarcity; there are always more social needs than resourcesto satisfy them, more ailmentsto treat
than physiciansor medical suppliesto treat them, and more people in need of care who cannot
afford it. While governmentofficials and public health specialistsare trained to tackle these
problems, the physician is in a unique position to contributeto the end goal of overall well-being
as she is both a provider of medical care and an expert who understandsthe social factors which
affect health. Physicians should harbor deep concerns about the state of health in their

community and therefore must recognize a need to be actively involved in solutions as promoters
of the public health.
As physicians within their communitiesincreasinglywork to solve the health care
problems of today, their involvementis chara~teristicof the changing attitudes regarding
medicine. These physiciansactive in solving health care problems "are on the cutting edge of a
new social philosophy that treats the challenge of rescuing sick children from the ravages of
poverty as more of an art than a science" (Shore, 2001, 78). There is no comprehensive
government solution to current health care problems on the horizon----nopanacea to improving
the health of our communities.But there are physician-artistswho are at the forefront, creatively
tackling these problems as they use their medical knowledgecoupled with an understandingof
social forces to discover solutions.
As Bill Shore stated in The cathedral within: Transforming your life by giving something
back, "Poverty's paradox is that it creates medical problems that can't be cured with medicine,

so these doctors find themselves looking for vital signs that can't be found with a stethoscope:in
household budgets, parent-childdynamics, and family histories" (2001, 74). In medical care
there is an increasingfocus on the wholistic care of patients that has broadenedthe scope of
physicians' contractual obligations.In treating patients, physiciansare more concernedthan ever
before about understandingthe social factors in a patient's life which affect health. Similarly,a
capitalisticsociety broadens the scope of medical social obligation·s,requiring physiciansto care
about more than the health of their patients. If health care was universal, and the transfer of
medical knowledgecontractual, one might be able to argue that the best means of discharging
these responsibilitiesis through the physician-patientrelationship.However, in the context of a
capitalistic society, health care access is not universaland the transfer of medical knowledge is,

in large part, dependent upon the non-contractual interactions among physicians. These
conditions require the physician to embrace non-contractual obligations in order to further the
ends of the profession, namely the health of society.

In conclusion, a global world creates medical problems that cannot be cured solely from
health care provided through the contractual physician-patient relationship. Physicians who
embrace the ends of the profession and desire to elevate the health of their communities must
look for vital signs outside of just the patients they treat. The health problems of today require
creative solutions, and as physicians play an increasingly key role in this process, they continue
to hone their skills as artists in addition to scientists. The physician-artist who is actively
engaging in and contributing to health issues is pivotal to the well-being of her community.

The motivationalquestion
As outlined above, physicians do have social responsibilities which are grounded in the
nature of medicine as a profession and the current challenges of health care in a capitalistic
society. On the assumption that there are such duties, the practical question then becomes one of
motivation.
There are health needs within society that can be met through physicians' fulfillment of
their social responsibilities. There are many individuals who are uninsured or lack access to
quality health care and are in need of assistance. There are emergencies in the form of natural
disasters or human conflict that require the volunteer, immediate services of medical
professionals. There are searches for cures for the prevalent diseases of our day which need the
benefits of medical knowledge-sharing-whether

physicians are in consultation with each other

about a particular patient, or whether a physician is collecting clinical data for a study. There are
politicians forming health care policies that require the involvement of physicians in order to

reflect a well-informedand innovativeperspective.There are physicianstraining to be
tomorrow's leading health care providers who need the mentoringof today's experts. In all these
scenarios, the well-being of society is enhanced by those physiciansfulfilling their social
responsibilities.
Physicians do have social obligationsand health needs in society are addressedwhen
they act upon them. If we care about these duties, then we must also care about physicians
fulfilling them. But it is not enough to praise the fulfillment of duty without regard for the
motivation behind it. Not only do we want these duties fulfilled, but we want them fulfilled for
the right reasons.The practical question followingan assumptionof these duties becomes a
moral question about motivation-how should physicians be motivated to fulfill social
obligations?

This thesis is based on the assumptionthat physiciansdo have social obligationsthat
extend beyond their contractual,dyadic obligationstowards their patients such as providing
indigent care, lobbying politicians,promoting public health or collecting data for research. While
this thesis will address the various grounds of these social obligations,the grounds of these broad
responsibilitiesof physicianswill not be its main focus. Rather, starting from this premise, the
thesis will ask the related, nonnative question: how should physicians be motivatedto fulfill
social obligations?While the grounds behind the premise of medical social obligationsare
fundamental,the motivationsof physicianswho are fulfilling these obligations are of great
practical importance.An understandingof motivationallows one to ask, what are those shared
beliefs and values common to the medical profession, and how can they be used as sources of
motivation in the fulfillment of social responsibilities?

This thesis specificallyaddresseshow physiciansshould be motivatedto fulfill their
social obligations by consideringfour prominentcategoriesof motivation.Chapter two looks at
the physician who is motivatedto fulfill social obligationsjust because it is the right thing to do.
The moral value of such duty-basedmotivationsis considered,drawing heavily from Immanuel
Kant's Foundations of the metaphysics of morals (1969). Chapter three discussesthe physician
who is motivated to fulfill social obligationsout of self-interest.The grounds of social
obligationsof physiciansare establishedfrom the responsibilityto fulfill the ends of the medical
professionas defined in Plato•s Republic ( 1993). Additionally,·the distinctionbetween selfish
and self-interestedmotivationis drawn. Chapter four looks at the physician who is motivatedto
fulfill social obligationsbecause she feels compassionfor others. The moral value of such
sympathy-basedmotivationsis considered,reflectingupon Martha Nussbaum's Compassionand
terror (2003). Chapter five describesthe moral worth of religious beliefs that motivate

physiciansto fulfill social obligations.Specifically,the groundsof the Christianphysician's
obligationsare establishedfrom the love commandmentsand the parable of the Good Samaritan.
Religiousmotivationsare found to be morallyworthy in inspiringextensivecompassionand
sustainingself-interestedreligious identity.
In additionto the philosophicalcomponentsof this thesis, an empiricalresearch study
conducted at Crossover Ministry informs this normativeevaluationwith answersto the question,
how are medical professionalsmotivatedto volunteertheir services?This empirical study
surveyed volunteer medical professionalswho provide charity care at this free clinic in
Richmond, VA. Out of 175 surveys distributed,a total of 105 medical professionalsresponded
{responserate: 60%). Of these 105 medical professionals,54 were physiciansand the remaining
51 practitionersincludednurses, opthalmologists,physical therapists and physicianassistants.

The survey questioned respondents about their motivations to volunteer their medical services at
Crossover Ministry (for a copy of the survey, refer to Appendix A). Each of the four motivations
of duty, self-interest, compassion and religious motivation was composed of a number of items.
The reliability of each scale was tested to see if people made similar responses to all the items
within a category of motivation. Indeed, after minor adjustment, all were sufficiently reliable.
Results of the study are incorporated throughout this thesis in the context of the discussion of the
moral worth of each motivation.
Understanding how physicians should be motivated to fulfill their social responsibilities
holds great practical value in encouraging all physicians to engage in such activities.

Chapter two: Motivated to fulfill social obligations out of duty
Physicians, when asked what motivates them to fulfill social obligations specific to the
medical profession, sometimes respond that they are motivated out of a sense of duty or that they
act because they feel it is the right thing to do. Motivations of this type are not unlike the Kantian
ethic which prescribes that acts of moral worth must be done out of a sense of duty. This chapter
looks at the moral worth of duty-based motivations founded on Immanuel Kant's Foundations of
the metaphysics of morals. Section one of this chapter outlines the Kantian grounds of the social
obligations of physicians according to Kant's first and second versions of the categorical
imperatives. Section two extrapolates from Kant's account to how physicians should be
motivated. Section three then critiques Kant's assessment of motivation on the basis that his
assessment discounts morally relevant motivations which inspire the fulfillment of duty. This
chapter lays the foundation for the argument of this thesis, namely that there are other
motivations outside duty that are morally worthy in the fulfillment of social obligations.
Compared to Kant's conception of morally worthy motivations, this thesis proposes a more
liberal standard for the evaluation of the morality of required actions done in accordance with
duty.
The grounds of the social obligations of physicians according to
Kant's first categorical imperative
For Immanuel Kant, "nothing in the world ... can possibly be conceived which could be
called good without qualification except a good wilr (Kant, 1969, 11). Only the good will as
directed by reason is capable of defining the moral worth of an action. Thus reason's
determination of one's duty may be derived from application of the first version of Kant's
categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time

will that it should become a universal law'' (Kant, 1969, 44). For Kant, when actions are
performed according to a principle that one could will to be applied universally, duty is fulfilled.
Kant further distinguishes "stricter or narrower (imprescriptible) duty" from "broader
(meritorious) duty" (Kant, 1969, 48). Strict duties include those of a contractual nature such as
the duty to fulfill promises or the duties of physicians to patients. For example, to determine if
we have a strict duty to fulfill promises according to Kant, we must try to imagine a world in
which everyone does not fulfill their promises. Because promises in such a world would have no
worth, this kind of world cannot be imagined and so it would produce a conceptual contradiction.
From this inconsistency we can deduce that we have a strict duty to fulfill our promises. Strict
duties are determined through such contradictions in conception in applying Kant's first
categorical imperative. The strict duties of physicians to patients can also be derived in this
manner. First, we must try to imagine a world in which physicians do not fulfill their duties to
patients. Because such a physician-patient relationship would not be founded on trust and the
delivery of health care would be inconsistent, such a world cannot be imagined. More generally,
if we try to imagine a world in which no one kept their contractual obligations, this would be
impossible because much as with the example of fulfilling promises, contracts would have no
worth. From these contradictions in conception, we can deduce that physicians have a strict duty
to fulfill their obligations to patients.
Those required actions committed from a sense of meritorious duty include broad duties
to oneself such as cultivating talents, and broad duties to others such as the obligation to help
people. In applying Kant's categorical imperative, broad duties are determined not through
contradictions in conception but through contradictionsin will. Consider two examples of the
determination of broad duties according to Kant. In order to determine ifwe have a broad duty to

self, we must attempt to will a world in which no one fulfilled this duty to themselves. Then we
must see if willing to not fulfill this duty to self would produce a contradiction with another
willed behavior to the self. For example, while we might be able to conceive of a world in which
no one cultivated his talents, the question for broader duties then becomes, can we will such a
world? According to Kant, a man cannot will a universal law of failing to develop talents, "For,
as a rational being, he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed, inasmuch as
they are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes" (1969, 47). Rationality demands the
pursuit of ends, and one needs talents in this pursuit. Therefore, a rational being cannot will a
universal law of failing to develop talents, for willing to fail to develop his own talents would be
in contradiction with his will to pursue his own ends. Applying this concept of broad duties to
the self, a physician must will to develop her own medical skills in so far that she wishes to
pursue the ends of a successful medical practice in her community.
Beyond such broad duties to the self in the pursuit of one's own ends, Kant further
discusses broad duties to others in the pursuit of social ends. The contradiction in will is derived
in a different manner with respect to these duties to others as compared to broad duties to the
self. For example, with regards to helping behavior and the first version of Kant's categorical
imperative, it might be possible to imagine a world in which no one helped anyone else. One
could conceive of such a world, but could one will such a world? Kant argues that everyone
needs help at one point or another, and thus to will for someone to help you at a given time and
also to will that no one help anyone else is a contradiction. The contradiction in will derives from
willing that everyone (which must include the self) engage in the behavior while simultaneously
willing that oneself not engage in the behavior. Based on this argument, helping behavior cannot
be excluded from our broader obligations. On the topic of furthering the happiness of others,

Kant similarly adds, "I should seek to further the happinessof others... merely because the
maxim which excludes it from my duty cannot be comprehendedas a universal law in one and
the same volition" (Kant, 1969,68).
In terms of these broader duties, Kant allows for greater flexibility in fulfilling them as
compared to stricter duties. For example,while the principle of never breaking promises is a
strict duty which must be adhered to at all times, the fulfillmentof broader duties such as
cultivating talents or helping people is not absolutein terms of the time and manner in which that
requirementis applied.
An understandingof Kant's first categoricalimperativeand his distinctionbetween strict

and broad duties can be employedto derive the social obligationsof physicians.This section
establishesthe grounds of physicians' social obligationsusing Kant's first categoricalimperative
based upon three lines of reason: first, physicianshave general social obligationsas part of their
duty to help others; second, physicianshave social obligationsas professionals;thirdly,
physicianshave specific social obligationsas medical experts.
First, physicians' social obligationsare groundedin the Kantianresponsibilityto help
others. Actions of physiciansfulfilling social responsibilitiesfall in the same category as helping
behavior, namely that of broad, meritoriousduties to others. With helpingbehavior, it is clear
that one cannot will the help of another and simultaneouslywill a world in which no one assisted
anyone else. By the same logic, one also cannot will the non-contractualhelp of a physicianand
simultaneouslywill a world in which no physiciansassisted anyone beyond their patients. But

mustphysiciansthemselveswill the non-contractualhelp of other physicians?
This question can be answered in the second line of argument groundingphysicians'
social obligations,namely that physicianshave social obligationsbased on their general status as

professionals. With respect to other professions, one must concede that a physician requires the
assistance of others outside the medical community with specialized knowledge. For example, a
physician may draw upon the expertise of someone with specialized knowledge about a specific
culture or an interpreter in dealing with an immigrant patient. A physician may also draw upon
the expertise of a lawyer in public advocacy work. Although such situations are non-contractual,
the fulfillment of general social obligations by other professionals is instrumental to the
physician's own ability to best fulfill her role. As such, a physician cannot will the assistance of
a professional and also will to live in a world in which professionals hold no social obligations,
for this would be a contradiction in will.
Finally, physicians have social obligations which are specific to their position as medical
experts. These social obligations include, but are not limited to, emergency situations. It is
reasonable that all individuals, both physicians and non-physicians,must will the assistance of a
physician outside of the contractual physician-patientrelationship in emergency situations. For
example, one must will that an individual with medical knowledge be moved to help in
emergencies such as a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina or an attack like September 11th• In
both situations, physicians provided immediate medical care to victims regardless of whether or
not the individuals were their patients. Thus applying Kant's first version of the categorical

imperative, one can assert that physicians do have a social duty to help in emergency situations.
The question then becomes, do physicians have more specific social obligations outside of
emergency situations as medical experts according to Kant?

It seems reasonable that most individuals, including physicians, require the assistance of
a physician with specialized medical knowledge in non-contractual,non-emergency situations at
some point in their Jives. For example, in the United States where health care is a commodity, it

is subject to the rise and fall of the market economy. In situations where the demand exceeds the
supply and there is a subsequentshortage of health care, individualswithout health insurance and
without the ability to pay for health care at any point in their lives must will that physicians
fulfill social obligations beyond their patients in order to receive the medical assistancethey
need. This becomes increasinglycritical for communitiesof low socio-economicstatus with little
resources and drastically limited access to health care professionals.Individualsliving in such
communitieswith inadequateaccess to health care cannot will a world in which physiciansdo
not meet social obligationsfor such a world does not further autonomousreason. But how
prevalent are these communities?
USA Today reported 75 million individualsin the United States who went without health
care coverage for a period of time in 2001 to 2002 (USA Today, 2003). More recent data shows
that as much as 15.6% of the US populationwas uninsured in 2004, and perhaps surprisingly,
8% of these uninsured hold at least the equivalentof a college degree (Census, 2005).
Furthermore,an analysis of the uninsured by income also showed that 8% earn an annual income
of $75,000 or higher (Census, 2005). Given these demographics,it is probable that a number of
physicians have been or will be without health care coverage at some point in their lives,
particularlybefore becomingphysicians.Any physician who has been without health care
coverage in the past must will that physicianstreat indigent patients as part of their social
obligations.
One might argue that those individualssuch as physicianswith the economic means to
pay for medical services do not need non-contractual,non-emergencyhelp from other
physicians, and thus could will a world in which physiciansdo not meet social obligations.First,
this argument is not reasonable given that physiciansstill need the non-contractual,non-

emergency assistance of other professionals and thus must will to live in a world where all
professionals meet these obligations. However, consider also how even those of high socioeconomic status benefit from fulfilled social obligations of physicians with regards to their own
medical care. The quality of care that these patients receive is dependent in part on the voluntary
medical knowledge-sharing that occurs between physicians, on public health research, on
medical ethics decisions and on the education of future physicians.
As medical care has become increasingly specialized, teams of physicians frequently care
for the same patient and thus joint consultation is certainly necessary and beneficial. This
contractual medical knowledge-sharing is instrumental to quality health care for the patient. Yet
this kind of medical knowledge-sharing also takes place in non-contractual situations. For
example, physicians often draw upon the medical knowledge and expertise of colleagues in
treating their own patients. Take a pediatric cardiologist in New York faced with an especially
unique health problem for one of his patients. In order to provide the best care for this patient, he
may contact a colleague in North Carolina and request advice in the situation. We might consider
it part of the New York physician's contractual obligation to seek out his colleague's advice in
order to best improve the health of his patient. However, while he may have this contractual
obligation, certainly there is no contractual obligation on the part of the North Carolina physician
who is volunteering medical knowledge for an individual who is not her patient. In such cases of
non-contractual medical knowledge-sharing, do physicians have a broad duty to share their
medical knowledge? The North Carolina physician cannot will to ignore the requests of her New
York colleague, and simultaneously will that she benefit from the voluntary sharing of medical
knowledge by her other colleagues. Much as with the grounds for helping behavior, this
contradiction in will is the basis for the grounds of the broad duty of the physician to share her

medical knowledge when reasonably possible to do so. All individual patients, regardless of their
socio-economic status, who are in contractual relationships with a physician directly benefit from
this voluntary sharing of medical knowledge. Thus, even those of high socio-economic status
including physicians must will that the dissemination of medical knowledge within the medical
community fall under broader obligations of physicians.
Additionally, those who can afford proper health care still benefit from widely publicized
data on public health issues or other research which is achieved through the non-contractual,
non-emergency help of physicians. The voluntary acquisition of data by physicians contributes to
public health research which affects all of society. While leaders of many public health
investigations may be fulfilling contractual duties (for example if they work for the government
in a public health role), the collection of data for such research can often involve the voluntary
assistance of physicians. For example, a physician might agree to collect quantitative data from
his patients for use in a clinical study or other public health project. The voluntary actions of
physicians who assist in data collection for projects such as preventative medical research or
research on the containment of disease contribute to the preservation of a healthy society. As all
individuals in a society, including physicians, benefit from the maintenance of a healthy
community, physicians must will that all physicians fulfill social obligations such as those duties
related to the furtherance of public health.
Furthermore, with regards to medical ethics decisions, physicians frequently voluntarily
serve on hospital administrative boards or ethics committees that determine quality of care and
policy issues surrounding health. While they often do not receive monetary compensation for this
service, physicians' participation and input into the details of health care provision is vital to
improving medical services. Thus it is reasonable for patients of that hospital. including

physicians who receive medical care from colleagues at the hospital, to will that their physicians
volunteer on these committees as part of their social obligations.
Furthermore,the training of physicians is dependent upon the transfer of medical
knowledge from each previous generation of physicians.Current physicians benefited in the past
from the voluntary mentoring of elder physicians-from concrete examples such as shadowing
physicians, rounding in the hospital under the care of a physician, or completing a residency with
a physician to less concrete examples of encouragementand consultation from elder physicians.
As they benefited from the voluntary sharing of medical knowledge as students, current
physicians must also engage in the social obligation of training the next generation of physicians.
These arguments show that quality of health care is affected by many non-contractual
actions of physicians. Examples of such actions include research on public health, service on
hospital committees and the education of future physicians.For all these reasons, even those with
the economic means to pay for medical care such as physicians themselves must will the noncontractual, non-emergencyhelp of physicians with specializedmedical knowledge in order to
optimize the level of health care available in their society.
Given the Kantian broad duty to help others, it is clear from both the physician's role as a
professional and a medical expert that physicians have the broad duty to engage in social
obligations. Beyond providing emergency care, physiciansmust also will to engage in other
social obligations such as medical consultation,training medical residents and serving on
hospital committees in order to maintain the high quality of health care available to the
community at large. Application of Kant's second version of the categorical imperative sheds
further light on the grounds of the social obligationsof physicians.

The grounds of the social obligations of physicians according to
Kant's second categorical imperative

Kant's second version of the categoricalimperativefurther elucidatesthe grounds of
social obligationsphysicianshold: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" (Kant, 1969, 54). The negative
duty of never treating humanity as 'means only' can be illustratedby the duty to tell the truth.
For example, accordingto this secondversion of the categoricalimperative,duty forbids lying
because if one lies to another individual,one is treating that person as means to one's own end
and not respectingtheir ability to reason.
Beyond the negative duty to never treat humanityas means, the positive duty of always
treating humanity as ends is also key to this second version of the categoricalimperative.As
Kant further explains:"For the ends of any person, who is an end in himself, must as far as ·
possible also be my end, if that conceptionof an end in itself is to have its full effect on me"
(Kant, 1969, 55). To treat others as ends requiresthat one recognizethe worth of others' own
rational pursuits, and further contributesto their ends insofar as it is reasonablypossible to do so.
In a similar manner, for the physicianto treat her patients as ends in themselvesand not means,
she must contributeto their ability to functionautonomously.In other words, it is not enough for
the physicianto simply do no harm to the patient. Such actions, though fulfilling the negative
duty of not treating humanityas means, would not fulfill the positive duty oftreating humanity
as ends. As Kant further clarifies, "this harmonywith humanity as an end in itself is only
negative rather than positive if everyone does not also endeavor, so far as he can, to further the
ends of others" (Kant, 1%9, 55). In fulfillingthe positive duty to treat humanityas ends, the
physician must contributeto the rational agency of the patient.

In applying this second categorical imperative-tothe social obligations of physicians, it is
evident that physicians' role in the preservation of health is instrumental towards the treatment of
humanity as ends and the further advancement of the rationality of all patients. A baseline of
health is necessary for individual liberty and the optimal functioning of any society. Health falls
into the category of welfare interests as a minimal but non-ultimate goal. When health is
damaged, a person's autonomy is seriously harmed because his aspirations and ability to reason
are undermined by his physical state. As such, the keepers of health are critical towards the
furtherance of mankind's rationality. Good health is a condition for exercising rationality, and
thus the engagement of physicians in the promotion of health is essential to treating humanity as
ends. While fulfilling social obligations for the sake of well-being or improving health as ends in
themselves would not be particularly Kantian, there is a sense in which these values of wellbeing and health are preconditions for exercising rationality. If health is essential for the function
of rationality, it is reasonable that health must be preserved.
But does application ofKanfs second version of the categorical imperative indicate that
physicians have duties to advance health beyond their patients? In other words, can a physician
fulfill her broad duties as a medical expert to further the projects of others solely through the
relationship with her own patients? With Kant's emphasis on the collective nature of individuals
as humanity with respect to meritorious duty, it seems apparent that the scope of these duties
extends beyond the interactions with individuals to which one is contractually-obligated.
In the physician-patient relationship, the physician is under a contractual obligation to
advance the health of the patient to the best of her ability. Such health experienced by the patient
can be viewed as a precondition for exercising rationality. Within this realm of her own patients,
it may be possible for the physician to fulfill broad social obligations. For example, one could

meet the requirements of the duty to help others by teaching an illiterate patient how to read. But
is it possible, within this contractual relationship, for the physician to fulfill her broad duties to
help others in the context of her medical knowledge or skills? In fact, because the relationship of
a physician and patient is contractual in nature, any care provided to the patient in the medical
context by the physician falls under the confines of strict, contractual duties. It follows that
though it may be possible to fulfill broader helping duties to others in the context of one's
patients, it is not possible to fulfill broader medical obligations. As a result, furthering humanity
as an ends requires that the physician fulfill medical social obligations outside the context of her
own contractual patients. According to this application of Kant's second version of the
categorical imperative, physicians do have a duty to engage in the promotion of health at the
social level.
Also consider a more specific example in the application of Kant's second version of the
categorical imperative. According to this version, do physicians have a duty to engage in noncontractual medical knowledge-sharing as previously derived in this chapter from Kant's first
version of the categorical imperative? From the categorical imperative of treating humanity as
ends, one can derive the physician's duty to share her medical knowledge on two accounts. First,
since not sharing medical knowledge would be free-riding on other physicians who do share their
knowledge, such actions would not treat other physicians as ends in themselves and thus
physicians must have a duty to share their medical knowledge when reasonably possible to do so.
Secondly, not sharing one's medical knowledge could detract from the preservation of the
rationality of a patient, and thereby in fulfilling the duty to treat humanity as ends, physicians
must voluntarily share their medical knowledge with their colleagues in order to treat all patients
as ends.

More generally,one might argue that the best way to fulfill the Kantian ethic of treating
humanity as ends by engaging in helping behavior is to do so with what one uniquely has to
offer. Thus, the lawyer ought to help others, especially through his knowledgeof the law; the
pastor ought to help others, especiallythrough her knowledgeof the spiritual; and of course, the
physician ought to help others, especially through her knowledge of medicine.
Based on Kant's second categorical imperative,physiciansdo hold social obligations in
the context of their role as medical experts, includingthe obligation to share medical knowledge.
The fulfillment of these obligationspositively furthers the autonomy of rational agents.
An application of Kant's first and second versions of the categoricalimperativeindicates
that physicians do have social obligations.But beyond the question of grounding.how does
Kant's understandingof morality contributeto an assessmentof the motivationbehind fulfilling
these social duties? The next section evaluates the moral worth of motivation behind such actions
based upon Kant's ethical theory.

Kant's assessmentof motivationin thefulfillmentof social obligations
According to Kant, reason is supreme and the moral worth of an action is directly"
dependentupon the sense of duty behind it Kant asserts that other motivationsare of no moral
worth: "To duty every other motive must give place, because duty is the condition of a will good
in itself, whose worth transcends everything" (Kant, 1969, 23). For Kant, motivationbased on
inclinationhas no moral worth. In cases where actions line up with both inclinationand duty, one
might apply a test of moral worth by seeing whether or not one would still commit the same
actions even if one was not inclined to do so. In other words, if a physician is inclined to educate
the next generationof physicians because she enjoys doing so, the test of the moral worth of her
action is not based on the consequencethat she has fulfilled her duty. Rather, the test of moral

worth is determined by whether or not she would still train incoming physicians even if she was
not inclined to do so. If the answer is yes, then her action is appropriately morally worthy; if no,
her action is based on an inclination and is therefore of no moral worth.
Furthermore, Kant makes the distinction between hypothetical and categorical
imperatives. It is not enough for the imperative to be hypothetical-in other words, for
motivations such as the glory of God, self-interest,the good of others, etc., to be ends for the
sake of which one might do the moral thing. Rather, the imperative on which one acts must be
categorical-that is, if the action is to have moral worth, morality must be considered an end in
itself. For example, Kant states, ''the categorical imperative alone can be taken as a practical law,
while all the others may be called principles of the will but not laws" (Kant, 1969, 43). Principles
of the will are transient; what is moral cannot be determined by the results actions produce.
Clearly, Kant is not a consequentialist, for he states "What is essentially good in it [the
categorical imperative] consists in the intention, the result being what it may" (Kant, 1969, 38).
Here intention means the motivation behind the act, and good intention refers to motivations of
duty based on reason. Thus the morality of an action is not dependent upon the consequences
that action produces but rather the nature of the intention behind the action. According to Kant,
the categorical imperative as "the unconditional command leaves the will no freedom to choose
the opposite" (Kant, 1969, 43). Using reason, one can only come up with the morally right
answer in the application of a categorical imperative.
Kant also speaks of the dangers of heteronomous influences on the autonomous reason.
For example, he defines heteronomy as "every case in which an object of the will must be
assumed as prescribing the rule which is to determine the will" (Kant, 1969, 71). Under such
heteronomous influences, the autonomy of reason is bypassed because an outward object of the

will prescribes the rule rather than the will itself, as in the example of action done because it is
the will of God. According to this rule, physicians who fulfill social obligations for religious
reasons are not performing acts of moral worth. Furthermore, Kant states that the will in
heteronomous cases "never determines itself directly by the conception of the action itself but
only by the inventive which the foreseen result of the action incites in the will-that

is, 'I ought

to do something because I will something else"' (Kant, 1969, 71). Accordingly, heteronomous
influences also include consequential motivations such as physicians fulfilling social obligations
from the sole motive that their actions elevate the health of the community.
In evaluating the motivations of physicians fulfilling social obligations according to the
Kantian ethic, one might first ask, did the physicians do what duty required of them? Assume
physicians did meet their social obligations, perhaps by volunteering in a free clinic, lobbying
politicians or engaging in clinical research. What would Kant say ought to motivate these
physicians as they meet these meritorious duties? The Kantian question then becomes, why did
they do it? And more specifically, did they do it from duty (as opposed to self-interest,
compassion, or religion, for example, in which cases their actions might still be in accordance
with duty)? From Kant's perspective, it is clear that physicians ought only to be motivated to
fulfill their obligations out of a sense of duty in order to perform acts of moral worth.
A critique of Kant's ethical theory
While Kant's ethical framework provides a compelling justification for the grounds of the
social duties that physicians hold, his absolutist position on the nature of the motivation behind
acts of moral worth disregards many morally worthy motivations in physicians' fulfillment of
social obligations. For example, according to Kant, none of the following actions have moral
worth: a physician provides care to the indigent because doing she enjoys doing so; a physician

provides care to the indigent because she wants to elevate the health of her community; a
physician provides care to the indigent because she has compassion for others; a physician
provides care to the indigent because she feels it is God's will that she do so. Is it problematic to
discount the moral worth of the above actions simply because they are not solely motivated by
the autonomous reason's determination of duty?
The above examples pinpoint actions committed from a wide variety of motivations
which are self-interested, compassionate, or religious in nature. Physicians are also motivated by
duty, but in a more expansive sense than the Kantian definition of duty. Contemporary ideas of
"duty" are based upon much broader influences than the Kantian-based duties determined
through application of the categorical imperative. Physicians, like everyone else, might talk
about performing actions out of a sense of duty. However, though some may mean duty in the
same way that Kant does, others may conceive of duty in a different manner. For example, when
a physician says she is motivated out of a sense of duty or obligation, she might mean she has a
duty to fulfill social obligations as defined by tradition, religion, or social forces including the
law, all of which Kant would discount as heteronomous.In contrast, Kant defines actions done
from duty in the specialized sense. Compared to Kant's specialized conception of duty, these
other, so-called duty-based motivations are heteronomous and thus can hold no moral worth in
Kant's framework.
Consider the extent of agreement with statements of motivation regarding duty by
medical professionals surveyed at Crossover Ministry. Respondents were tested to see if they
rated the four motivations of duty, self-interest, compassion, and religious motivation differently.
An analysis of the data showed that they did rate these motivations differently, and further tests

defined these differences. As it turns out, respondents were significantly more likely to identify

compassion, not duty, as their primary motivation. Furthermore, there was no significant
difference between duty, self-interest and religious motivation. Therefore, in this particular
sample of physician volunteers, Kantian duty is not a significant motivator to fulfill social
obligations. Within-subjects tests further identified a significant negative relationship between
duty and religious motivation. This negative correlation indicates that the more individuals are
religiously motivated, the less likely they are to be motivated out of Kantian duty. Furthermore,
this data also indicates that some other so-called duty-based motivations such as religion are no
more significantly motivating that the Kantian conception of duty. Finally, a within-subjects
analysis of data indicated no significant difference between duty and self-interest. In other
words, people were no more or less likely to identify duty as a motivator than self-interest.
Kant's view allows for three types of actions in the assessment of morality: those which
are required, those which are merely permissible, and those which are forbidden (Table 1).
Clearly, forbidden actions have no moral worth as they contradict duty, and merely permissible
actions cannot be morally worthy because they fail to fulfill duty. One can further distinguish
motivations behind forbidden actions as having negative moral worth, whereas motivations
behind merely permissible actions simply have no moral worth. However, when it comes to the
motivation behind required actions, Kant asserts that those actions done in accordance with duty
also have no moral worth; only those required actions performed from duty have moral worth.

Action

Motivation

Morality

Required

From duty

Moral worth

In accordance with duty

No moral worth

Merely Permissible

n/a

No moral worth

Forbidden

n/a

Negative moral worth

I Table 1: Applying Kant's theo1'J=Action,Motivationand Morality.
There are three reasons why Kant's determination of morality is inadequate with respect
to the morality of required actions done in accordance with duty. First of all, just because some
motivations may not be as good as the motivation based on Kantian duty, it does not follow from
this that these other motivations have no moral worth. Second, within required actions
committed in accordance with duty, there are some motivations which are clearly morally better
than others. Third, many motivations that inspire actions in accordance with duty are clearly
better in their quality of moral worth than motivations that inspire merely permissible actions. In
this case, required actions done in accordance with duty should have a different moral worth
when compared to merely permissible actions.
First of all, Kant objects to all motivations other than Kantian-duty when distinguishing
actions of moral worth. For example, his account implies that the physician providing indigent
care out of a sense of duty even though he is not inclined to do so is completing an act of great
moral worth. In contrast, the physician providing indigent care out of compassion is fulfilling a
duty but nonetheless, completing an act of no moral worth. Perhaps the former physician's
fulfillment of his social obligations may be considered more admirable since he is doing the right
thing even though he is not inclined to do so. However, comparatively it does not seem that the

other physician's similar actions are entirely void of moral worth simply because his inclination
is aligned with the required action. It would not follow that because the one physician is
fulfilling obligations out of duty and thereby completing acts of moral worth, the other physician
fulfilling obligations out of another motivation such as compassion cannot be completing acts of
moral worth.
Undoubtedly, some motivations can undermine the morality of an act, and thus it could
be problematic to claim that any motivation leading to the completion of a required action is of
moral worth. However, while Kantian duty might be the best motivation, it does not follow from
this that all required actions outside of those done from duty have no moral worth.
Secondly, within the category ofrequired actions done in accordance with duty, it is clear
that some motivations are definitively different from bad motivations such as the distinction
between caring for the indigent out of compassion as compared to caring for the indigent to pad a
resume. Take another example of providing charity care in order to make colleagues feel guilty
or to get in the good graces of a political representative. These motivations might undermine the
moral worth of the act of providing care to the indigent. Moral theory ought to reflect the fact
that motivations such as compassion for the uninsured or concern for the elevation of health are
morally different from these clearly bad motivations.
Thirdly, Kant's determination of the morality of required actions done in accordance with
duty does not make a clear distinction between the moral worth of these actions as compared to
the moral worth of actions that are merely permissible. Based on a considered view of morality,
most of us would be uncomfortable placing actions committed out of compassion in the same
moral category as actions committed without relevance to duty. For example, it seems
incongruous to evaluate the charity care of a physician based on compassion as morally equal (in

its quality of having no moral worth) to another physician's participation in an exercise class at
the gym. Actions done in accordance with duty (in Kantian terms, actions committed from
inclination based on a heteronomous influence) appear to be of greater moral worth than other
merely permissible actions because the motivations behind these actions inspire the fulfillment of
duty.
It seems insufficiently discriminating to evaluate motivations behind the fulfillment of
duty in the same way we evaluate motivations behind merely permissible actions, and for good
reason. If we are concerned about social obligations such as the duties physicians hold to society,
we ought also to care about the fulfillment of these obligations. One cannot care about the
fulfillment of duties without considering the multifarious motivations that lead to their
fulfillment, and certainly the morality of motivations behind such required actions merit greater
consideration than of those behind merely permissible actions for the former lead to the
fulfillment of duty.
Clearly, motivations outside of Kantian duty, although perhaps not as good, can still have
moral worth. Furthermore, there are some motivations behind required actions that are better
than others. Finally, motivations inspiring required actions done in accordance with duty should
be considered separately from motivations inspiring merely permissible actions in the
determination of moral worth. From these arguments it follows that many required actions done
in accordance with duty are performed from motivations that do have moral worth.
The Kantian ethic convincingly depicts the grounds of the social obligations of
physicians. While Kant's strict determination of morality based on motivation is limited, this
chapter finds that some required actions performed in accordance with duty do have moral
worth.

How might this understanding of morally worthy motivations according to Kant be
helpful in promoting the fulfillment of social obligations by physicians? Specifically. the model
of motivation presented in this chapter would assign moral worth to the actions of some
physicians who provide charity care in free clinics out of motivations other than duty. In
promoting the non-contractual interactions of physicians, these interactions should be seen as
duties and many of the motivations behind these actions ought to be viewed as morally worthy.
The rest of this thesis explores the moral worth of these other motivations. The next three
chapters tum to specific arguments about self-interest, compassion and religious motivation to
see if physicians should be motivated in these ways.

Chapter three: Motivated to fulfill social obligations out of self-interest
Self-interest can refer to many motivations, but perhaps the most common motivation
that comes to mind in this category is that of monetary compensation. In fact,, in a free market
economy, the prediction of consumer preferences by neoclassical economic theory rests on the
dominant assumption that consumer actions within the market are guided by self-interest.
Physicians are part of this free market economy and potentially motivated out of self-interest
when their actions are monetarily compensated, such as in the case of the provision of care to
patients. Furthermore, monetary compensation is also, though infrequently, employed to
motivate physicians to use their medical skills beyond their patients.
Regardless of whether or not physicians are receiving monetary compensation for the use
of their skills beyond their patients, the quality of health care we receive is partly dependent
upon the actions of physicians beyond the physician-patient relationship. In a nation where
medicine is not sheltered from the rise and fall of the market, the importance of physicians
meeting social obligations even in the absence of monetary compensation is readily apparent.
Given the essential contribution of physicians volunteering their services, the aim of this thesis is
to address ways to motivate physicians to continue to engage in social obligations that are not
compensated monetarily. While the definition of social obligations in this thesis precludes those
actions performed for monetary compensation, physicians engaged in the fulfillment of social
obligations may still be motivated out of other kinds of self-interest.
This chapter specifically addresses the question: are there self-interested motivations
which are both justified and morally relevant to the fulfillment of social obligations? Section one
of this chapter establishes the grounds of the social obligations of physicians according to Plato's
discussion of leadership in the Republic. Section two explores Plato's concept of moral

motivation and the role of self-interest in ethical behavior. Section three outlines the difference
between selfish and self-interested motivations, and concludes that self-interested actions can
have moral worth.
Plato's grounds for the social obligations of physicians
In a discussion of rulership in Plato's Republic, Socrates questions Thrasymachus' claim
that what is right is the advantage of the stronger party. Socrates analyzes Thrasymachus'
argument by framing the discussion of rulership in terms of the nature of crafts. He first
emphasizes that crafts have a purpose which is not to their own advantage. After assuming that
rulership is a craft, he concludes that the purpose of rulership is not to seek its own advantage but
rather to look after the well-being of those being served. In his discussion of the purpose of
crafts, Socrates uses the example of the craft of medicine, asking Thrasymachus about the
purpose of the physician. IfThrasymachus' claim is to be supported, what is right ought to be to
the advantage of the physician. Trying to refute Thrasymachus' claim, Socrates asks him "the
one who's a doctor in the strict sense of the term. Is he a businessman or someone who attends
to sick people? Think about the genuine doctor'' (Plato, 1993, 341 c).
By setting up this dichotomy, Socrates is not implying that the genuine doctor does not
earn any money in a business sense. Rather, Socrates is asking Thrasymachus to think about
what it means to be a physician. In essence, by referring to the genuine doctor, Socrates is
ultimately asking Thrasymachus to make a claim about the overarching purpose of the profession
of medicine and, the purpose of the professional, i.e., the physician. When considering the two
options Socrates gives--either that the doctor is a businessman or someone who attends to the
sick-it

is evident that only the former will support Thrasymachus' prior claim. For

Thrasymachus to support his argument that what is right is to the advantage of the stronger, the

medical profession would have to be defined in such a way that its purpose is to engage in what
is to its own advantage. However, Thrasymachus responds to Socrates' question with support for
the latter definition, as he states that the doctor is the one who "attends to sick people" (Plato,
1993, 341 c). While the doctor does receive money for his services, his purpose as a member of
the medical profession is to treat the sick. Socrates' illumination of the altruistic purpose of the
physician and Thrasymachus' agreement with this position refute Thrasymachus' prior claim of
what is right. What is right is not the behavior recommended by Thrasymachus' conception of
the advantage of the stronger. In the case of the physician, what is right is the furtherance of the
purpose of the medical profession, which is actually the advantage of the weaker or the sick.
In his book on Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organizational Ethics and Leadership,
Marvin T. Brown's distinction between purpose and motive in the "for-profit" sector sheds more
light:
In The American Heritage Dictionary, "for-profit" is defined as: "Established or operated
with the intention of making a profit: a for-profit hospital." Key to this definition is the
notion of intention. To say that individuals intend to establish or operate a hospital for
profit, however, is not the same as to say that the hospital, as an organization, intends to
make a profit. If a human person has intentions, it usually means that the person is
motivated to do something. Behind the motivation are desires, which originate from our
situated embodied existence. Organizations are not situated in a similar way. They are not
part of the animal kingdom. They cannot be motivated by profit, because they do not
have motives. Profit may motivate an individual to start a company or to work for one; it
cannot ''motivate" a corporation. (2005, 111)
Just as organizations do not have motives, one could argue that professions do not have motives
either. Rather, it is the people in the profession who have the motives. Motivations are extrinsic
to the craft or profession of medicine, because the profession of medicine is concerned with more
than individual doctors. The ends of medicine are not individual ends. but social ends. The
identity of a physician derives from his acceptance of the ends of medicine as his own ends in his
practice of the craft.

While Socrates and Thrasymachus conclude that the true doctor is not simply a
businessman, we might wonder if monetary compensation is nonetheless linked to our notion of
what it means to be a physician. However, an appeal to common sense would tell us that the
person who provides only charity medical care is just as much of a physician as the one who sees
patients for monetary compensation in a private practice.
A further distinction arises from Plato's Republic with respect to the purpose of a craft. It
follows from Socrates' arguments that seeking the ends or purposes of a craft is not the same as
seeking the preservation of that craft itself. For example, Socrates draws a parallel argument to
the purpose of the physician when he further explains, "medicine does not consider the welfare
of medicine, but the welfare of the body" (Plato, 1993, 342c). Similarly, the purpose of a
physician in his practice of medicine is to seek the physical welfare of others and not his own
welfare. For example, in Plato's Republic, Socrates explicitly states, "Surely, then, no doctor, in
his capacity as a doctor, considers or enjoins what is advantageous to the doctor, but what is
advantageous to the patient?" (Plato, 1993, 342d). In a parallel fashion, the purpose of medicine
is to consider the welfare of its constituents, not to consider its own welfare. In other words, a
physician 1 s practice of medicine ought not to be intrinsically focused on the preservation of
medicine itself any more than it ought to be intrinsically focused on his own welfare. Rather, the
physician's practice of medicine ought to be intrinsically focused on the well-being of the body.
For example, the discovery of a mistake in medical treatment ought not to be brushed under the
rug in order to preserve the respectability of the physician or the medical profession. Instead,
medical mistakes must be addressed in light of the ends of the profession, namely, what is best
for the well-being of those being served.

For the purposes of our discussion, the grounding of the social obligations of physicians
according to Plato rests in this necessity to fulfill the ends of the medical profession which he
defines as treating the sick. If medicine ought not to seek its own preservation first and foremost
but rather the well-being of the body, then physicians in their role as doctors ought to be
primarily concerned with these ends of the profession.
But what, specifically, does it mean for the physician to be concerned with what is
advantageous to the body? To whose body, and to what extent, and to how many bodies? This
thesis supports the idea that the purposes of medicine at minimum extend beyond the physicianpatient relationship. In the context of this thesis, the question of ''whose body" extends beyond
the physician's patient's body. The question of ''to what extent" goes beyond supporting what is
directly medically advantageous to a physical body to include promoting health through indirect
medical activities such as public health research, training and even ethics. And again, "to how
many bodies" goes beyond just those bodies a physician treats to include those individuals at
minimum in the local area and even extending the sphere to a national or global level. One could
talk about the scope of a physician's responsibilities as including the promotion of the health of
the "social body." In effect, this thesis holds that the physician ought to be concerned with what
is advantageous to this "social body." However, would Plato have supported this broad
understanding of social obligations for physicians as defined in this thesis? An understanding of
medicine in ancient Greece may provide more insight into Plato's argument.
In The Hippocratic Oath and the Ethics of Medicine, Steven Miles discusses a variety of
roles the Greek physician would have performed beyond that of caring for individual patients.
These roles included working with armies, traveling on diplomatic missions, treating the sick
during epidemics, responding to civic health disasters and serving in appointments as "city
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physicians" (Miles, 2004, 56). Miles further writes that physicians of the time understood "that
the physician-citizenship role promoted the health of the citizens of a city-state, just as clinical
work promoted the health of individuals" (Miles, 2004, 56). Considering the traditional
occupations of physicians in the ancient Greece of Plato's day, it seems plausible that he may
have considered many of these services as falling under the ends of medicine and thereby
contributing to what is advantageous to the body. Furthermore, the Republic argues that what
would best contribute to society determines the individual's role in society. Physicians engaging
in these services outside of the physician-patient relationship are optimally contributing to
society.
Thus, we can conclude that physicians ought to be concerned with promoting the health
of their community at large. When Plato's concept of what is advantageous to the body is
understood in this context, those actions of physicians defined as the fulfillment of social
obligations certainly meet the ends of the craft. In this way, the social obligations of physicians
are grounded in their fulfillment of the purpose of medicine as defined by Plato which is to
provide what is advantageous to the social body.

Plato 's assessmentof motivation in thefulfillment of social obligations
At first consideration, it may appear that self-interested motivations are antithetical to the
ends of the craft of medicine, and thus are not moral and should not be encouraged. After all, in
fulfilling the altruistic purpose of medicine by treating the sick, there does not appear to be much
room for self-interest.
Ultimately, the physician's actions should be infonned and motivated by the ends of her
profession which, according to Plato, are the provision of that which is physically beneficial. The
care for the human body which a physician is to provide thus may not be instrumental towards

goals other than this end, but rather must be intrinsic to the work of a physician. The focused
ends of the craft of medicine which Plato defines are outward-looking, requiring that the
physician see beyond himself to the proper care of another. This dogged focus on the physical
well-being of the body may cause us to wonder, is there space for morally grounded selfinterested motivations in this framework? To answer this question, we must first take a look at
Plato's view of self-interest.
In his discussion on leadership, Socrates further elucidates that people who ask to be paid
to serve in positions of authority do so, "because anyone who works properly with his expertise
consistently fails to work for his own welfare ... when he gives instructions as a profession. It
isn't his welfare, but that of his subject, which is his concern" (Plato, 1993, 347a). Because the
ruler's concern is the welfare of his subjects, the leader must satisfy his concern for his own
welfare outside his role as ruler. Similarly, because the physician's concern is the welfare of
those she is serving, the physician may seek her own welfare only outside her role as a physician.
In other words, though an individual may be morally free to pursue her own projects in other
dimensions of life, specifically in her pursuit of a craft she is not morally allowed to do so. The
physician can pursue his own projects which may not be aligned with the ends of medicine in
cases when he is not acting in his role as a medical expert.
Socrates' argument explains "why it is necessary to pay people with money or prestige
before they are prepared to hold authority, or to punish them if they refuse" (Plato, 1993, 347a).
While leaders can be persuaded to rule via money, honor, or punishment upon refusal, Plato
further argues that in a city of just men no person would be willing to rule for money or honor.
According to Plato, neither money nor prestige is a moral motivation, for both are despised by
the best kinds of people. In other words, motivations based on money or honor are not just self-

interested but selfish, and therefore immoral. Rather, the just man is persuadedto rule in
conditionswhere the consequencesof not ruling are to be ruled by an unjust leader. Socrates
states, "The ultimate punishmentfor being unwillingto assume authority oneself is to be
governed by a worse person, and it is fear of this happening... which prompts good men to
assume power occasionally"(Plato, 1993, 347d). The motivation of the good man whowill rule
in order to avoid being ruled by an unjust leader is straightforward.He will rule because it is in
his own self-interestto do so. Still, it is not selfish for him to act in this way because he is not
motivated by the prospects of money or honor.
As Socrates continues, ''were a communityof good men to exist, ... it would be glaringly
obvious that any genuine ruler really is incapable of consideringhis own welfare, rather than that
of his subject, and the consequencewould be that anyone with any sense would prefer receiving
benefit to all the problems that go with conferringit" (Plato, 1993, 347d). Though not motivated
by money or honor, it turns out that the individualswho make up Plato's city of good men are
motivated by some form of self-interest.If a good man chooses to accept a position of rulership
to prevent being ruled by an unjust person, he may be sacrificingthe pursuit of some of his own
projects in leading. However, by avoiding being ruled by an unjust leader, he would still be
acting in part in his own self-interest.
But does the position of the ruler adequately serve as an analogy for the moral worth of
the motivationsof the physician to adopt the ends of her profession?In the case of Socrates'
discussion of rulership, the two key aspects of motivationand action with respect to the leader
should be considered in drawing an analogy between the ruler and the physician. With respect to
motivation, the leader's actions are still partly self-interestedbecause the pursuit of his own
projects would be diminished ifhe were under an unjust ruler and his own pursuit of justice in

ruling constitutes happiness. With respect to action, the leader sacrifices some of his own
interests in his role as ruler. Consider, first, whether a parallel can be drawn between the leader's
self-interested motivations in ruling and the physician's motivations to pursue the ends of her
craft.
According to Plato, the good man who chooses to rule is acting out of self-interest in two
ways. Firstly, though the leader's self-interest is not met through the direct pursuit of his own
personal goals in the context of his role as leader, a person's ability to pursue these goals is
directly affected by leadership. Thus, in cases where the alternative to being ruled by an unjust
person (which may consequently halt the pursuit of one's own goals) is ruling oneself, it is in
one's self-interest to assume leadership. Secondly,just actions constitute happiness and it is in
one's best interest to be happy. Thus, in contributing to justice, the good man's exercise of
leadership will also constitute happiness for himself. But does the role of self-interest in the
actions of the ruler serve as an appropriate analogy for the motivations of the physician?
On the first account, it is in the self-interest of the good man to rule when he finds
himself in less-than-ideal circumstances. In essence, under non-ideal circumstances there appears
to be a second best in terms of self-interest for the ruler. But does this notion of a second best for
self-interest translate to the analogy of a physician? If the good man does not rule, the
consequences for him are to be ruled by an unjust leader. However, if the physician does not
pursue the ends of medicine, what are the costs to her ability to pursue her own self-interest? It
appears that the concrete, negative consequences to the physician of not engaging in these social
obligations are not daunting enough to motivate a physician to volunteer her services out of selfinterest.

However tenuous the analogy of the ruler and the physician on this first account, an
appeal to the second account of why the good man accepting leadership is acting out of selfinterest does apply in the case of the physician. The ruler is benefiting from just rulership which
seeks the welfare of society, but he is also benefiting because his just action to rule amounts to
his happiness. While the physician may not be directly benefiting from her efforts to fulfill social
obligations, she is benefiting indirectly because her just actions constitute happiness. By this
account, the analogy between the good man who chooses to rule and the physician holds true
because the physician fulfilling social obligations is acting justly and therefore acting in his own
interests by furthering what constitutes his happiness.
With respect to the actions of the leader, it also seems reasonable to appeal to an analogy
between the leader and the physician because one can draw a parallel between the sacrifice of the
leader and the sacrifice of the physician. Based on Plato's view of the motivation of good men,
there is a sense in which the good man willingly sacrifices some of his own interests in a position
of leadership in order that the ends of leadership might be achieved. In accepting a position of
rulership, the good man necessarily accepts the just ends of the profession and is thereby
motivated to act. In a similar way, there is a sense in which the genuine doctor must willingly
sacrifice some of his own interests in his role as a medical provider in order that the ends of
medicine might be achieved. In training to become a physician, the good man necessarily
pledges to pursue the purpose of medicine and ought to be thereby motivated to act.
But to what extent must the good man sacrifice his own interests in order to fulfill the
purpose of leadership? To what extent must the physician sacrifice her own interests in order to
further the ends of medicine? The extent of sacrifice required to achieve the purposes of
medicine depends upon the circumstances. Just as with the leader in Plato's city of good men,

ideal circumstanceswould allow individualsto ethically pursue their own interests. But ideal
circumstanceswould be situations in which all individualshad the ability to pursue their own
interests-in Plato's ideal city, all good men could pursue their own interests because the leader
would seek their.welfare. But much as Plato's city of good men is theoretical, in essence a sort of
utopia, these circumstancesrarely exist Consequently,the good man must rule or else an unjust
ruler gain power. There is a loss to the good man who serves as leader, but it is not an all-thingsconsidered loss. This life is not as good as it might have been in ideal circumstances-it would
be better ifhe did not have to sacrifice his own interests in order to lead. However, given the
circumstancesin which he finds himself, the good man is duty-boundto rule in his pursuit of
what is just. Similarly,greater sacrifice is required of physicians in fulfilling the ends of
medicine when ideal health care circumstancesdo not exist. In other words, when the health care
system is plagued by exorbitant costs, poor access, or low-qualitytreatment, physiciansare dutybound to sacrifice their own interests in the context of the professionto provide the best health
care to their communities.
Particularly with respect to medicine in a capitalisticsociety, the utopian ideal where all
can pursue their self-interestis not a reality. If all physicianspursued their own interests in their
practice of medicine,even more people would fall through the cracks of the current health care
system, and the overall quality of health care provision would be worse for it. In order to make
the pursuit of projects available to all, the genuine physician must be willing to sacrifice some of
his own interests in order to contribute to a situation in which this baseline of health is possible.
Though it may represent a loss to the physician to sacrifice his own projects for the sake of
bettering the health of his community,ultimately his just actions constitute happiness and
therefore it is not an all-things-consideredloss to him.

Thus, Plato's analysis of moral reasons to take on leadership is a compelling one in an
application of moral reasons for physicians to engage in social obligations. Physicians must
sacrifice their own interests in pursuit of the purpose of medicine in order for the optimal
treatment of the sick to be reached. Plato's assessment of motivation does not exclude selfinterested motivations as immoral. Instead, Plato's characterization allows self-interest to be
considered a moral motivation in the appropriate context.

The morality of self-interested motivations
Before further exploring the moral worth of the motivation of self-interest, additional
clarification of the relationship between self-interested motivations and selfish motivations is
warranted. As Paul Heyne states in his response to the most common moral objection to market
systems, '"Self-interested behavior is selfish behavior only if one's interests are selfish" (Heyne,
1995, 3). In other words, though all selfish behavior is self-interested, all self-interested behavior
is not necessarily selfish. For example, if a physician collects data for a clinical research study on
breast cancer patients only because he is monetarily compensated for his actions, his behavior is
both selfish and in his own interest (i.e. self-interested). However, if a physician collects data for
the same clinical research study because he hopes to contribute towards a cure for his mother
who is also a breast cancer patient, his actions are self-interested in that he is pursuing his own
desire for his mother to be healthy, but his actions are not necessarily selfish. In other words, in
cases where one's own interests are other-regarding, one's actions are self-interested but not
necessarily selfish.
A detailed reflection of motivation reveals that some self-interested motivations are, in

fact, moral and thereby worthy of encouragement. \Vhile it may seem ethically dubious to
engage in actions for the self-interested and selfish reasons of monetary compensation or the

padding of a resume, there may be other self-interested motivations which do not conflict with
morality, and even others which rest on solid moral ground. Consider a few other scenarios
where the morality of a self-interested motivation may not be as clearly wrong. Perhaps a
physician trains medical residents because it makes bim feel needed, or increases his self-esteem.
Another physician may volunteer on a hospital committee because it helps her to escape her own
troubles. Yet another physician provides charity care for social reasons such as the approval of
family or the opportunity to sustain friendships. Consider also the physician who collects data for
a public health project in order to increase her own understanding of the subject, or to gain a new
perspective about a problem in her community. And what about the physician who volunteers
because engaging in social obligations is part of her identity as a physician? Many of these selfinterested motivations do not produce the same degree of moral opposition as do other selfish
motivations relating to wealth or status in society. Though these kinds of selfish motivations may
be permissible, they are not of moral worth. In fulfilling social obligations out of self-interested
(but not selfish) motivations, these physicians are also contributing to their own happiness by
doing what is just.

In Understanding and assessing the motivations of volunteers: A functional approach,
Clary and co-workers identify five types of self-interested motivation which are helpful in
categorizing the examples above (1998, 1516-1530). These motivations fall into the groupings of
protective, career, social, understanding and enhancement. Protective motivations include the
desire to feel less lonely, to escape or work through problems and to relieve guilt. For example, a
physician engaging in social obligations out of protective motivations might say that she
volunteers because no matter how badly she feels, volunteering helps her to forget about it.
Career motivations include opportunities to make business contacts, to explore career paths and

to succeed professionally. For example, a physician seeking to maintain his or her skills while
taking time off to raise a family might be motivated to volunteer at a free clinic. Social
motivations include the approval ofloved ones and the maintenance and establishment of

friendships. A physician might provide charity care because his or her spouse thinks favorably of
those actions. Understanding motivations include hands-on experience, the exploration of
strengths and the broadening of perspective. For example, a physician might agree to voluntarily
collect data from her patients for a clinical health study in an effort to hone her understanding of
the outcomes of treatment for a particular disease. Finally, enhancement motivations include
enhancing self-esteem and feeling important or needed. As an illustration, a physician may
provide emergency care because it makes her feel better about herself. While these categories are
helpful for a descriptive understanding of self-interested motivations, this chapter's primary
concern is with the normative question. Of these different self-interested motivations, which ones
have moral worth?
Again, the distinction between selfish motivations and self-interested motivations is
helpful. For example, if a physician is engaging in social obligations for understanding or career
motivations, we might further ask why is he thus motivated? He may seek to increase his
understanding of medicine by providing charity care only so that he can earn more money as a
physician. On the other hand, he may seek to broaden his perspective of medicine by engaging in
public health research so that he may be more qualified to lobby government on behalf of health.
care access for the poor. Again, the self-interested motivation is only selfish if one's interests are
selfish. Thus an analysis of motivation must take care to get to the root of the motivation behind
committing a particular action.

Consider the survey results of volunteer medical professionals at Crossover Ministry.
Out of twenty-one statements of motivation to which volunteers expressed extent of agreement,
six statements were designed to measure self-interested motivation (Table 2).

"I volunteer my medical services ...
... because it's my role as a physician."

Self-interested

... because I enjoy doing it."
... because it makes me a better doctor."
... because my profession looks highly upon volunteering."

Selfish

... because people close to me approve of my volunteering."
... because of the friendships."

Table 2: Self-Interested Motivation Statement.Iii.

Interestingly, initial tests indicated that self-interest and compassion were positively
correlated. In other words, individuals who were likely to rate.compassion as a high motivation
were also likely to rate self-interest as a high motivation. At first glance, this result is puzzling,
for one would not expect for an individual highly motivated out of compassion to also be highly
motivated out of self-interest-in

fact, to some degree, the two appear to be mutually exclusive.

However, additional analysis of the self-interested statements within the survey sheds further
light. A similar analysis of the correlation between compassion and the first three statements of
self-interest listed above (Table 2) reveals a correlation between self-interest and compassion in
the positive direction. This finding reinforces the results of the same test wit~ all six selfinterested statements included, though the results pertaining to only the first three statements
were not statistically significant. In comparison, an analysis of the last three statements of self-

interest listed above which are selfish (Table 2) and compassion is most striking. In this case,
there was no significant relationship between self-interest and compassion. But what about these
two groupings of self-interested statements accounts for these results?
Recall Plato's claim that good men will not rule for money or honor, motivations which
are "selfish." On the other hand, pursuing an action aligned with justice does constitute
happiness for Plato, and in this sense such actions are motivated out of self-interest and are not
designated "selfish." The last three self-interested statements appear to align with the idea of
honor more closely than the first three, and thereby may be distinguished as "selfish" (Table 2).
Comparatively, the first three self-interested statements on the survey appear to fall in the
category of self-interest, indicating that an individual volunteers his services because his
happiness is increased in so doing (Table 2). A physician who volunteers because she enjoys
doing so is morally self-interested according to Plato's distinctions. However, how are the
remaining two statements of self-interest ("because it's my role as a physician;" "because it's my
role as a doctor") categorized? Further clarification of the kind of doctor a physician is striving to
be would shed light on these two statements. Given the positive relationship between physicians
assigning a high rating to compassion and these two self-interested statements, it may be that
these medical professionals are motivated to become physicians with valuable medical skills in
order to give to their communities. In this way, the pursuit of their own goals involves
motivations which are other-regarding.
Compare morality according to Immanu~l Kant to Plato's view of morality. The morality
of a physician's actions according to Kant depends upon the motivation to perform them based
on duty alone. Alternatively, Plato's assessment of morality is dependent upon the action's

advancementof justice, which more specificallyin the context of medicineindicatesthe action•s
contributiontowards the ends of the medical profession(Table 3).
Motivation

Morality

Self-interest(lines up with

Moral worth

Action

Contributingtowards Ends

proper conceptionof end)

of Medicine

Selfish (desire-driven)

No moral worth

Neutral

n/a

No moral worth

Detracting from Ends of

n/a

Negative moral worth

Medicine

Table3: ApplyingPlato's Discussionof Leadership-----Action,
Motivationand Morality.
When a physician's actions in the context of his professiondetract from the ends of medicine,he
is committingactions of negative moral worth. When his actions in the context of his profession
neither contributeto nor detract from the ends of medicine ("neutral"),his actions have no moral
worth. This moral analysis of actions which do not contributeto the ends of medicine(either
becausethey are neutral or becausethey detract from those ends) is not unlike the Kantian
analysis of actions which are not required (either becausethey are merely permissibleor because
they are forbidden,see Table 1).
ComparePlato's view of morality with respect to actionsthat contributeto the ends of
medicine with Kant's analysis of actions that are required by duty. Plato's view is similar to
Kant's view in that those actions that contribute·to the ends of medicinewhich are also done out
of a desire to fulfill the ends of medicine are morallyworthy. However,with respect to actions
that contributeto the ends of medicine but are done for reasons outside of a desire to fulfill these

ends (similar to actions done in accordance with duty in Kant's analysis, Table 1), Plato's view
of morality does not indicate that all of these actions are of no moral worth. In contrast to Kant,
Plato's argument indicates that actions committed out of self-interest that line up with the proper
conception of ends are of moral worth. Plato's view discounts those actions that are desire-driven
and selfishly motivated.
More specifically, Plato's argument addresses the morality of self-interested motivations
that are in accordance with the fulfillment of the ends of medicine. In circumstances where all
have the capacity to fulfill their own interests, self-interested motivations do have moral worth.
For example, in a situation where everyone has access to quality health care based solely on the
contractual obligations of physicians, physicians seeking their own self-interest could be morally
justified. However, if the ends of medicine are to be pursued in a society where medicine is
distributed through market forces, morality excludes the pursuit of actions within the profession
of medicine for the sake of selfish reasons.
The physician's social obligations are grounded in Plato's definition of the ends of
medicine as the treatment of the sick. In circumstances where this treatment is not equitably
available, the physician ought to feel morally compelled to sacrifice some of his own selfinterests in the pursuit of the ends of his profession. In a capitalistic society, the ends of medicine
must be focused on ensuring a minimum standard of health for all individuals. The physician, as
a leader, must be motivated by a desire to seek the ends of the profession of medicine if she is to
commit actions of moral worth.

Chapterfour: Motivated tofulfill social obligationsout of compassion
Consider the fate of an indigent wanderer:
... a fellow from Hildesheim... Lame and hardly able to move, he was so infested with
vermin that he had fouled the cloth on which he lay, filling the entire house, yard, and
everything about him with his stench. The man had been brought to Crusius's place on a
handcart and dumped on his manure heap. (Neither a barbaric nor symbolicact in itself,
as the steam from the manure probably preventedhim from freezing to death in the raw
spring weather.) The commune of Hedwigsburghad tried to ship him back to Ohrum, but
Ohrum refused to accept him. Attempts to fob him off on the nearby villages also failed.
It was April, and the man 'has been on my back since Easter/ Crusius complained: 'I am
now at my wit's end.' The issue of what to do was debated back and forth for about a
week before the problem solved itself: The man had the good grace to die.
-Karen Geraghty (2005,1)
The plight of the indigent wanderer and Crusius' reaction are illustrative of the
failure of compassionto inspire generositybeyond one's moral circle of concern. Compassion
was not extensive enough to motivate the villagers from Hedwigsburgto care for the foreign
fellow from Hildesheim.The wanderer's plight may also reveal a broad weakness of duty,
namely that it is not a good motivator.
This chapter first explores the failure of compassionto inspire action when it is not
extensively applied. Secondly,this chapter addresses this weakness of compassionusing Martha
Nussbaum's concept of compassionwithin the limits of respect. Finally, this chapter establishes
the moral worth of compassionas a better motivator than duty.

The weaknessof compassion
The story of the indigent wanderer raises questions about the reliability of compassionin
motivating physicians to fulfill their social obligations.In other words, is compassion
consistently able to motivate physiciansto engage in social responsibilities?With respect to the
reliability of compassion,it could be the case that compassionmay only motivate a physician in
her relationshipswith her patients and not in the fulfillmentof social obligations.However,this
same compassionthat motivates one physicianto care for a sick patient may, for other

physicians, motivate them to engage in social responsibilities.For example, compassionmay
motivate the physician to share her medical knowledgewith friends and family when they are in
need of medical assistance.Compassionmay also motivate the physician to provide charity or
emergency care. When a physician engages in such social responsibilities,she is recognizingthat
her moral circle of concern extends beyond the scope of her paying patients. Thus when_
compassiondoes motivate a physician to engage in social obligations outside the physicianpatient relationship, it is reliable in that it encouragesthe physician to view her moral community
in an extensive manner.
But what of those circumstanceswhen a physician is not motivated out of compassionto
provide care? In the case of the opening story of the indigent wanderer, Crusius and the villagers
did not even consider the possibility of providing care for the sick man themselvesin so far as
we can tell. We must wonder, would this lack of considerationhave occurred if the sick man had
been from their own village of Hedwigsburg?Assume that compassionatecare for the man
would have been provided had he been of a member of their own village. If this is the case, this

story also conveys the confusion in determiningmorally worthy action when an outsider is
placed into one's physical circle of concern.
Critics of compassionclaim that it is not applied extensivelyenough to motivate the
consistent fulfillment of social responsibilities.Ostensibly,those physicianswho are not engaged
in social obligations are not motivated to fulfill these responsibilitiesand thereby lack a sense of
compassion to do so. However, it does not follow from the fact that some physiciansare not
motivated out of compassionto engage in social obligationsthat compassionis always unreliable
in inspiring such actions. For example, in the same instance, a physician who does not fulfill her
social obligations is not motivated by a duty to do so. However,just because a physician does

not use her medical skills beyond her patients does not mean that she does not have a duty to do
so. Rather, her conception of what her duty entails as a physician is skewed. In a similar manner,
just because a physician is not motivated out of compassion to use her medical skills beyond her
patients, it does not follow that compassion is not a morally worthy motivation. Just as with a
misconception of duty, one could argue that the physician morally ought to feel compassion to
fulfill social obligations.

It follows that duty is a reliable motivation only to the extent that it is properly
conceptualized. Similarly, compassion is a reliable motivation only to the degree that it is
extensively applied. In correcting misconceptions of duty, emphasis must be placed on
redefining the duty of the physician in such a way that social obligations are an accepted and
integral part of the responsibilities of the physician. In a similar manner, in correcting nonextensive compassion, emphasis ought to be placed on expanding the scope of compassion so
that more physicians are thereby motivated to act. Towards these ends, Martha Nussbaum's work
on Compassionand terror provides a framework in which the moral circle of concern of
compassion can be expanded (2003).

Nussbaumand compassion
In Compassion and terror, Martha Nussbaum develops a claim for the "moral value of
compassionate imagining" and "the ability of compassion to cross lines of time, place, and
nation" (2003, 1). She describes the role of compassion in the events of September 1I th as
Americans became aware of the sufferings of people whom they otherwise had thought little
about. She also hits upon the weakness of compassion as being both "narrow and self-serving"
(Nussbaum, 2003, 2). Nussbaum's work looks at "the question of what to do about compassion,
given its obvious importance in shaping the civic imagination, but given, too, its obvious

propensity for self-serving narrowness" (2003, 2). She contrasts the partiality of compassion with
the impartial nature of respect for human dignity, the latter motive not unlike the Kantian ideal of
treating humanity as ends. In proposing a framework in which to minimize compassion's selfserving weakness, she defends the need for compassion in relationships.
Nussbaum categorizes four evaluations inherent in demonstrating compassion:
assessment of the seriousness of a predicament (judgment of seriousness), the extent to which
one feels someone deserves the suffering (judgment of nondesert), shared vulnerabilities
(judgment of similar possibilities) and the depth of one's circle of concern (eudaimonistic
judgment) (2003, 4-5). But how do these specific aspects of compassion come into play in
motivating a physician to engage in social obligations?
First, consider specific social obligations such as emergency medical care and the
provision of charity care. With respect to the judgment of seriousness, an emergency situation is
defined by serious and urgent need, thus inferring a rating high in the judgment of seriousness
and encouraging compassionate actions. Furthermore, with charity care one could imagine that
patients who seek care at clinics even when they do not have the means to pay are probably
present for more than a routine check-up. In both emergency and charity care when the need is
acute, it seems that the judgment of seriousness made by a physician would elicit a
compassionate response. As Edmund Pellegrino put it, "To lack health and to need treatment is
to be in a diminished state of human existence-a

state quite unlike other deprivations which can

be borne if one is healthy" (1999, 248).
With the judgment of nondesert, a physician may be more or less inclined to judge the
individual as deserving of his physical condition. Undoubtedly, there are both genetic and
behavioral components that make an individual more or less susceptible to disease. However,

there are illnesses which some physicians may judge to be a direct result of lifestyle choices such
as obesity due to poor nutrition and lack of exercise, or sexually transmitted diseases due to
engaging in unprotected sex. On the other hand; with the increasing demand for physicians to
provide health care in a wholistic manner, a more nuanced perspective that assesses the indirect
causes of such actions may influence this particular judgment. It is increasingly viewed as the
physician's responsibility to understand the social context in which she practices as well as the
social circumstances in which her patients find themselves. The physician's challenge is more
than a mere accurate diagnosis of an ailment and the subsequent prescription of a quick-fix
solution. Her challenge is to understand the human being as he resides within a social aggregate,
and to develop a treatment plan detailing how an individual might integrate aspects of his
internal and external environment to maintain a healthy equilibrium. The business of healing
must be integrated into the situations of a patient's life (Koslowski, 1999, 19). As physicians
seek to be fully aware of the effects of the social and physical environments on the health of their
patients, they may increasingly attribute behavioral factors related to illness as the partial result
of environmental circumstances. Such an analysis may cause physicians to rate the patient low in
deserving illness and thus be more inclined to provide care out of compassion.
The third evaluative aspect of compassion, the judgment of shared possibilities, is likely
to be ranked especially high by all individuals in the context of health care. Everyone, including
physicians themselves, can imagine what it is like to be a patient. As Churchill states, "In the
needs of others we see ourselves, recognize our own neediness, and acknowledge our own
vulnerability'' (1987, 69). Within the physician-patient relationship, the patient is particularly
vulnerable, exposing his physical body and mental state to the physician. The ability of everyone
to understand this sensation through commonality of experience allows the observer, including

the physician, to share in the patient's vulnerability. Particularly with respect to health, the
judgment of shared possibilities is likely to be rated especially high and thus contribute to
compassionate motivation.
As sho'Ml, a compelling case can be made for reasons why physicians might rate the first
three judgments offered by Nussbaum particularly high with respect to their provision of charity
or emergency care, and thus be likely to be motivated out of compassion. This ethical analysis
provides one explanation for why compassion was the predominant motivation in the free
provision of services by medical professionals at Crossover Ministry. However, Nussbaum's
fourth evaluation of eudaimonistic judgment does not as clearly contribute to the likelihood of
compassion as a motivation to volunteer. Therefore, eudaimonistic judgment might be a key
point of additional concern in inspiring the fulfillment of social obligations out of compassion.
Eudaimonistic judgment as defined by Nussbaum refers to an individual's social scope of
concern. Eudaimonistic judgment highlights in-group and out-group distinctions, and when less
than universal in scope, may not be broad enough to elicit compassion for humanity far removed
from one's close relationships. In this evaluation, particularly for the physician, there is great
concern that compassion's self-serving narrowness may shine through. As Jonathan Glover
states, "The sympathies which really engage us are often stubbornly limited and local. I may
move mountains for my child, but perhaps I will not cross the street to be a good Samaritan to a
stranger. Sympathy may hardly extend to those outside a particular community" (1999, 28). For
compassion to motivate a physician to engage in social obligations, she must consider her circle
of concern to extend beyond just her patients to encompass at least her immediate community
and even the entire globe.

Such morally extensivecompassionmotivatedthe Good Samaritanto exhibit compassion
in caring for a fellow human being by the roadside. Yet, as Churchillpoints out, "The perception
of the Samaritanwas ofa fellow human being, a neighbor, and his virtue lay not only in the
helping acts he perfonned but in the perceptionthat he was of one fabric with the beaten man in
the road" (1987, 69). What is most admirableabout the Samaritan's actions is not the fact that he
chose to help, but rather whom he chose to help. The Good Samaritandemonstratedan extensive
moral concern and indicated"a primal recognitionof self in [the] perceptionof others"
(Churchill, 1987, 69). Given compassion's strong role in the civic imagination,greater attention
to this fourth evaluativefactor could further extend the reaches of compassionin motivating
physiciansto fulfill social obligations.
One way of addressinglow ratings of eudaimonisticjudgment relies on Nussbaum's
solution of"compassion within the limits of respect" (2003, 11). She suggeststhat, "the
educationof emotion,to succeedat all, needs to take place in a culture of ethical criticism,and
especiallyself-criticism,in which ideas of equal respect for humanitywill be active players in
the effort to curtail the excessesof the greedy self' (2003, 11). As suggestedby Nussbaum,this
education must begin at an early age when "Children should learn to be tragic spectatorsand to
understandwith subtletyand responsivenessthe predicamentsto which human life is prone"
(2003, 11). If compassionis to motivatephysiciansto engage in social responsibilities,it must
become part of the medical educationof society. Furthermore,critical attentionmust be paid in
the demonstrationof compassion,ensuring that one's circle of concern is morally extensive.For
example, a physician ought to be critically aware of those situationswhich do and do not elicit
compassionateaction that inspires him to volunteer.As Churchillstates, "circumstancesof
proximity will undoubtedlylead us naturallyto extend our sympathyto some more than others"

and further, "it is not self-evident that ties of proximity in age, sex, status, or blood are reliable
guides for our choices. The simple solution (but not necessarily the most just) is to help those
who are immediately before us while refusing to admit that we have made a choice at all" (1987,

69). Ethical criticism must recognize that individuals do have agency in determining whom they
help; self-criticism must consider what is guiding these choices. Greater self-awareness in the
display of compassion can assist the creation of situations in which physicians rate eudaimonistic
judgment highly because they place a larger sphere of individuals within their immediate circle
of concern.
But just how broad should one's moral circle of concern be? Clearly if compassion is to
serve as a motivation for physicians to fulfill social responsibilities, it must extend beyond the
scope of a physician's own patients. However, are there limits to how far compassion can go
before being watered down in terms of its genuine emotional content of fellow-feeling for
another? And are there limits which can be placed on compassion that would help to eliminate its
weakness to serve those closest to oneself? The next section considers how compassion
motivates Dr. Paul Farmer, a graduate of Harvard's School of Medicine who is actively involved
in international medicine.
A picture of compassion within the limits of respect
Farmer lingers beside the crib of a little girl with wasted arms and a torso bloated by
pleural effusion-caused by extrapulmonary TB. She lies on her side. He reaches in and
strokes her shoulder, saying softly, almost singing, in English, "Michela wants to give up,
but we're not going to let her are we? No, we're not going to let her."
-Tracy Kidder (2003, 31)
As Tracy Kidder wrote in his biography of Dr. Paul Farmer entitled Mountains Beyond

Mountains, "Doctoring is the ultimate source of his power, I think. His basic message is simple:
This person is sick, and I am a doctor. Everyone, potentially, can understand and sympathize,

since everyone knows or imagines sickness personally. And it can't be hard for most people to
imagine what it would be like to have no doctor, no hope of medicine" (2003, 295). Indeed, like
Farmer, most individuals do rank sickness high in a judgment of similar possibilities.
Dr. Paul Farmer is a founder of Partners in Health and a MacArthur Foundation Fellow,
as well as creator of a thriving public health system in Cange, Haiti. An arduous worker, Farmer
practices medicine both locally and globally in addition to teaching as a professor at Harvard
Medical School. Kidder describes his impression of Farmer as someone with an ability to
embrace "a continuity and interconnectedness that exclude[s] no one" (2003, 219). Dr. Farmer's
empathy for others appears limitless as seen in the punishing schedule he keeps and his resolute
focus on the individual in his goal of improving public health.
While some would criticize Farmer's use of his time in going to great lengths to treat
individual patients, this aspect of the care he provides is evidence of his philosophy that no one
patient is more important than another. As Kidder quoted Farmer's colleague as saying,
"Farmer's still going to make these hikes ... because if you say that seven hours is too long to
walk for two families of patients, you're saying that their lives matter less than some others', and
the idea that some lives matter less is the root of all that's wrong with the world" (2003, 294).
For Paul Farmer, his priorities begin and end with the individual, and his compassion has
motivated him to make many sacrifices in order to improve the quality of health of individuals.
Though a strong public health advocate whose practice takes him beyond the strict
confines of medical knowledge into the social environment in which illnesses develop, Farmer is
unlike many public health officials in that he would disagree that stopping the transmission of a
disease is more important that curing individuals. In fact, he views paying attention to individual
patients as a moral imperative (Kidder, 2003, 146). Furthermore, Farmer has an uncanny ability

to channel his compassion in such a way that he is moved to help anyone in need. Farmer's
compassion fuels his practice of medicine in such a way that his concern for all of humanity is
demonstrated in his passionate generosity towards individuals. Farmer's brand of compassion is
peculiarly both impartial in its global view of his moral circle of concern and particular in its
emphasis on helping at the individual level.
Farmer's demonstration of impartial compassion exemplifies Nussbaum' s call for
compassion within the limits of respect. Physicians should be morally encouraged to exhibit
impartial compassion, demonstrating impartiality in identifying their circle of concern while
simultaneously maintaining a sort of particularism in their specific interactions with others. The
particularistic nature of this impartial compassion contributes an emotional care for others that
impartiality alone cannot. Impartial compassion allows the demonstration of compassion to be
abstract enough to inspire action towards any number of individuals, but specific enough to
incite fellow-feeling towards the one being helped. Impartial compassion motivates Farmer's
work, inspiring him to touch individual lives with his ability to heal.

Distinguishingbetween different kinds of social obligations
While both Farmer's work and the Crossover study primarily address the role of
compassion in the provision of charity care, these examples fail to address the broader role of
compassion in the fulfillment of other social obligations of physicians. One might wonder: how
does compassion motivate physicians to engage in social obligations outside of providing care to
individual patients? For example, can compassion motivate physicians to serve on ethics
committees, to train new physicians, or to engage in research? While the role of compassion in
the relational aspects of social obligations seems poignant, one must question whether or not

compassion is both reliable enough and strong enough to elicit this sort of engagement without
direct emphasis on patients in need.
It follows that there is an important distinction to be made between the various kinds of
social obligations which may or may not be appropriately motivated by compassion. While
providing indigent or emergency care-aspects
nature-is

of social obligations which are relational in

often driven by compassion, serving on ethics committees or training future

physicians or engaging in clinical research may seem less relevant to the motivation of
compassion. This distinction is found not only in the relational quality of the first group of
obligations but also in the concrete and pressing human need evidenced in this first group. It is
the urgency that accompanies the provision of health care to sick individuals as well as the
dignity of the individual readily felt through personal interaction that set these actions apart from
other obligations.
Given these constraints on compassion, it may be that duty can serve as a motivation for
a larger sphere of obligations (including both the relational social obligations as well as other
non-relational obligations) and may thereby be deemed of greater moral worth. However, in the
actions that both duty and compassion do promote, we must consider if compassion offers
something morally unique as compared to duty that makes it at least as morally valuable as dutybased motivations?

Duty as motivation
Duty may be considered a more reliable motivation than compassion in some contexts. It,
unlike compassion, enforces the necessity to engage in actions such as serving on hospital
committees in addition to providing indigent care, and even when a physician may not be
emotionally inclined to do so. However, as discussed earlier, duty is reliable to the extent that it

is properly conceptualized, in the same manner that compassion is reliable to the extent that it is
extensively applied. But beyond the proper conception of duty, is duty a good motivator? The
story of the itinerant wanderer at the beginning of this chapter emphasizes an important
distinction between duty and compassion that is helpful for an elaboration of duty's ability to
motivate.
In order to discuss duty as motivation with respect to the story of the itinerant wanderer,
we must first establish if Crusius and his community feel some sort of obligation towards this
sick individual. The story seems to indicate that they did feel a duty towards the fellow from
Hildesheim. After all, they did not move him from the manure heap of Crusius' backyard to the
outskirts of the city, or even leave him alone to perish at sea. Rather, though Crusius and his
fellow townsmen were not enthused to care for the man themselves, they were conscientious
enough not to neglect some duty they had towards the man given his close physical proximity to
them. Consequently, they attempted to find another village that would accept the responsibility
to care for the wanderer. The villagers had a strong enough sense of duty to believe that this man
was owed some help, though perhaps not from themselves. However, their attempts to rid
themselves of their duty by placing the wanderer out of the scope of their obligations were met
with failure.
Though it is evident that Crusius and others in his community felt some sort of obligation
for the itinerant wanderer, this sense of duty failed to motivate them to care for the sick man.
Beyond their limited conception of how to best fulfill their duty to help this fellow human being,
the possibility of providing care for the sick wanderer themselves was not even considered, at
least as far as we can tell. Instead, time and energy were expended discussing the nuisance of the
situation and searching for another village that would take the sick man. Cruisus and the villagers

were duty-bound to do something given the man's close proximity, so they tried to get him out of
their circle. In this case one must wonder if the effort expended in attempting to rid themselves
of the man fallen ill had instead been directed in compassionate care, would the man have
recovered? After all, it was no more than a couple weeks after the man had been placed in
Cruisus' backyard that he died.
As Geraghty states, ••... physicians would do well to remember the fate of the itinerant
wanderer, whose only misfortune was to fall ill in a community that fought more passionately for
its policy than it did for its humanity" (2003, 2). The indigent wanderer's misfortune was to find
himself in poor health amongst people whose passion for humanity was overshadowed by the
burdens of fulfilling obligations. In this particular case, duty was not a strong enough motivator
to inspire Crusius and his fell ow villagers to act.
But is it more often the case that individuals fail to fulfill their social obligations because
they do not consider it their duty or because they are not compassionately inclined to do so?
Consider a comparison of duty and compassion in the Crossover Ministry empirical study which
surveyed medical professionals who fulfill social obligations by providing charity care.

The role of compassionin inspiringvolunteer medical service
Surveyed medical professionals at CrossOver Ministry expressed the extent to which
paragraphs describing the motivations of duty, self-interest, compassion and religion closely
aligned with their own motivations to volunteer their services (Appendix A). Data analysis
showed that respondents were significantly more likely to indicate that compassion was their
highest motivation as compared to duty, self-interest or religion. In like manner, when ranking a
series of paragraphs describing these same four motivations, physicians consistently ranked the
paragraph about compassion as most compatible with their own motivation. An analysis of

subscales comprised of statements regarding each of the motivations also demonstrated that the
level of agreement with the statements of motivation was significantly higher for compassion as
compared to other motivations. Thus, from three separate measures, survey results indicated that
compassion was the predominant motivation in volunteering medical services for the respondent
population. In contrast, respondents indicated duty to be less of a motivator than compassion,
and not significantly different from the motivations of self-interest and religion.
In the case of physicians fulfilling social obligations, surely a physician without
compassion will not act out of compassion in the same way that a physician without a proper
conception of duty will not act out of duty. But the results of this study indicate that compassion
does motivate physicians in this case, and is a more likely motivation of physicians in inspiring
acts of medical volunteerism than duty may be in this and relevantly similar contexts.

Compassionas motivation
Compassion demonstrates fellow-feeling through a focus on the alleviation of suffering.
In many ways, compassion is an extension or demonstration of sympathy, the latter defined by
Churchill as "an analogous sentiment springing up at the thought of another's situation" ( 1987,
63). One imagines what it would be like to experience suffering in a particular situation, and is
further motivated by a desire to alleviate the suffering of another.
In the plight of the indigent wanderer, Crusius' intent focus on duty was the result of a
reasoned conception that the essence of the problem at hand was the necessity to fulfill a duty.
Had Crusius instead been motivated by compassion to care for the sick man, the definition of the
problem at hand may have been less cerebral but more sympathetic. Even if some might argue
that Crusius acted out of a desire to avoid guilt resulting from neglecting duty, his actions were
rationally executed, with much planning and debating preceding request to other villages to take

on the sick man. Churchill's analysis of sympathy is particularly poignant in this regard:
"Sympathy ... does not depend on conscious acts of will, rational assessments of harm or benefit,
noble purposes, charity, good will, or altruism. It is simply part of the human condition that we
are sympathetic beings, and it is on this uncalculated and unwilled responsiveness that morality
depends" ( 1987, 66). A rationalized conception of duty is simply not motivating the way that
compassion is motivating. Compassion is needed to focus help on specific individuals.
Demonstration of fellow-feeling through compassion requires a redefinition of the problem in
such a way that the focus is on the individual suffering rather than on the need to fulfill duty
regardless of the circumstance, inclination or consequences.
In determining the manner in which one might fulfill a Kantian broad duty such as the
duty to help others, Kant does not specify what motivations should guide an individual to help a
particular person in a particular manner at a particular time. In fulfilling a broad duty to help
others because it is the right thing to do, there is a critical difference between dispensing of one's
duty in such a way that it alleviates guilt about neglecting the duty and meeting the obligation in
such a way that expresses compassion for the individual in need. This distinction is again evident
in the story of the itinerant wanderer. While Crusius recognizes that he is duty-bound to help the
sick man, in dispensing of this duty he is more concerned about determining his own

responsibility to help rather than alleviating the suffering of the sick individual. Crusius been
motivated out of compassion as opposed to a desire to alleviate guilt, the resulting manner in
which he would have fulfilled his duty would have made a world of difference to the man fallen

ill. This realization raises an important question: what is it that compassion contributes to the
fulfillment of social obligations that duty alone cannot?

For Kant, actions committed out of compassion fall under the category of actions
performed in accordance with duty. As such, they have no Kantian moral worth. Because
compassion as a primary motivation is discounted as heteronomous by Kant, it may seem that his
framework does not allow for the allotment of any moral worth to compassion. However, does
Kant's framework allow space for the moral grounding of compassion as a secondary motivation
in the determination of how to go about fulfilling broad, Kantian duties?
Within the context of fulfilling broad duties, it may be possible to justify the potential
moral worth of impartial compassion within the Kantian framework. As addressed in the second
chapter of this thesis on duty, physicians' social obligations fall under the category of broad,
meritorious duties according to Kant. Further recall that in Kant's description of broad duties,
including the duty to help one another, he allows for flexibility in the time and manner in which
such duties are fulfilled. Kant stipulates that broad duties are arrived at through application of the
categorical imperative, and that individuals must be thereby motivated to act. However, beyond
the role of motivation in designating the moral worth of such actions as duties, Kant does not
stipulate how one ought to be motivated to flexibly fulfill these broad duties. Inevitably in the
fulfillment of broad duties, there will be choices for the ethical individual to make. Ultimately,
the choice to help this individual or that individual, or to help at this particular time or that time,
or to help in this manner or in that manner will be motivated by what Kant calls a heteronomous
motivation.
Thus, perhaps there is room for compassion in a Kantian understanding of duty. While it
is indisputable for Kant that physicians have the broad duty to help people, compassion can serve
as a powerful indicator of when and how and to whom these duties ought to be fulfilled. For
example, in the case of Crusius, a demonstration of compassion may have further directed him to

fulfill his duty to help a fellow man through sympatheticcare of the individualrather than
through attempts to place him in the care of another. In contrast, conceptionsof Kantian duty are
not specific enough to direct the individualto choose how to dispense of broad duties. In
Crusius' case, duty could be respected by dischargingit through care for the sick man or by
making the duty go away as Crusius attempted to do. In placing the sick man in the realm of
another village, Crusius' duty would have been relieved because he would have ensured that it
was someone else's obligationto help the sick man. Whether or not this other individual chose to
help the sick man would not have been of Crusius' moral concern in a Kantian framework. In
contrast, compassionapplied extensivelywould only be satisfied by providing care for the sick
man himself.
A concern for the fulfillmentof social obligationsby physiciansnecessitatesa concern
for those motivationswhich promote such actions. With respect to the demonstrationof fellowfeeling, compassionwhich elicits completingsocial responsibilitiesis a morally worthy
motivation. However, in order for compassionto be a reliable motivationtowards the ends of
meeting social obligations, it must be cultivated within the limits of respect. The creation of a
culture of ethical criticism, and particularly self-criticism,is instrumentaltowards increasingthe
reliability of compassionas a morally worthy motivation.Furthermore,in an increasinglyglobal
world, the demonstrationof impartial compassionwith a particular emphasis on the individual
will continue to further the moral scope of concern of compassionwhile maintainingits unique
contribution as an expression of fellow-feeling.

Chapter five: Motivated to fulfill social obligations out of Christian beliefs
All the great religious traditions of the world say, Love thy neighbor as thyself. I'm sorry,
I can't, but I'm going to keep on trying.
-Dr. Paul Farmer quoted in Tracy Kidder's
Mountains Beyond Mountains (2003, 213)
Dr. Farmer's statement recognizes both the duty to love one's neighbor as oneself
emphasized in many religious traditions and the near impossibility of completely attaining such a
goal. Paul Farmer's commitment to the ongoing battle of improving public health raises the
question: what drives religious people to strive consistently for what may appear to be
unattainable? More important for this thesis, is religious belief even a morally worthy motivation
in the fulfillment of social responsibilities?

Religion as a Kantian heteronomous influence
For Kant, duty is determined by reasoned application of the categorical imperatives and
the moral worth of an action is based on the sense of duty behind it. Though many people might
feel duty-bound to act a certain way throughout life, there are many other ways that people
conceptualize these obligations outside of the application of Kant's categorical imperatives. For
example, people might define their responsibilities in terms of their culture, the political law of
their state, or the religious dogmas to which they are committed. Such influences on duty would
be considered heteronomous according to Kant, because something other than reason itself is
prescribing duties such as social norms, government, religious leaders or even God. The
heteronomous nature of religion may lead us to consider Kantian thought as directly opposed to
religious beliefs. For example, Ronald Green writes: "Kant, the rationalist foe of all religious
enthusiasm and emotion in the moral life, the advocate of unflinching devotion to duty, does not
strike one as a thinker likely to understand the meaning of religiously inspired, self-emptying
love" (1992, 261 ).

But though Kant would reject the grounding of the social obligations of physicians in a
conception of duty that is not purely reasoned, as could be the case in instances of religious duty,
the heteronomous determination of duty may have implications for the moral worth of
motivations. To the extent that religious grounding of physicians' social obligations lines up with
Kantian duty, in other words insofar as religion tells people the right thing to do, there may be
cases where religious beliefs inspire the fulfillment of duty much as the morally worthy
motivations of compassion and self-interest do. Thus, this chapter considers the moral worth of
religious beliefs that inspire the fulfillment of duty and are thereby in accordance with duty.
While this chapter seeks to investigate the fulfillment of social obligations based on
Christianity, the author recognizes that many of the fundamental motivations discussed herein
apply to a wide variety of belief systems in addition to Christianity. However, in the interest of
exploring the predominant religious motivation espoused by the Crossover Ministry physicians
surveyed as part of this thesis, the author has chosen to highlight the grounds and motivations of
social obligations from a Christian perspective.
Section one of this chapter explores the grounds of physicians' social obligations
according to Christianity. Section two considers Christian love in the context of Kantian thought.
Section three explores the extent to which religion actually motivates physicians to engage in
social obligations. Section four considers religion as instrumental in activating self-interested
motivations. Finally, section five considers religion as instrumental in activating compassionate
motivations.
The grounds of physicians' social obligations according to Christianity
The grounding of physicians' social obligations from the Christian tradition may develop
from a variety of sources such as biblical doctrine, tradition, personal experience and Christian

community. This section looks at the grounds of physicians' social obligations specifically with
respect to biblical doctrine, the standard of faith and practice for many Christians. One way to
ground these obligations would be in terms of the love commandments expressed in the
canonical gospels.
The love commandments are often taken to be fundamental to Christian beliefs because
Jesus Christ uses them to distill the law of the Old Testament into two duties, namely, "'You
shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind"'
and '"You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Matthew 22:37, 39, NRSV). Many Christians
believe that these love commandments encapsulate the responsibility of the Christian as given by
God. In the words of Jesus Christ, "'On these two commandments hang all the law and the
prophets"' (Matthew 22:40, NRSV).
But what does it mean to fulfill the first commandment of loving God?The New
Testament book of I John defines the duty to love God as a duty of obedience: "For the love of
God is this, that we obey his commandments" (I John 5:3, NRSV). According to I John, the
Christian's obedience to God's commandments manifests her love for God. In other words,
obedience to the second commandment to love one's neighbor is a manifestation of love for God.
As Gene Outka puts it in Agape: An Ethical Analysis, "If one loves God one is not free to decide
whether to love the neighbor or not" (1991, 44). By this logic, love of God necessitates doing
God's commandments, and since God commands that one love one's neighbor, love of God
necessitates love of neighbor.

With respect to God's love, I John further adds:
Beloved, let us love one another, because love is from God; everyone who loves is born
of God and knows God. Whosoever does not love does not know God, for God is love.
God's love was revealed among us in this way: God sent his only Son into the world so
that we might live through him. In this is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us
and sent his Son to be the atoning sacrifice for our sins. Beloved, since God loved us so
much, we also ought to love one another. No one has ever seen God; ifwe love one
another, God lives in us, and his love is perfected in us. Those who say, "I love God,"
and hate their brothers or sisters, are liars; for those who do not love a brother or sister
whom they have seen, cannot love God whom they have not seen. The commandment we
have from him is this: those who love God must love their brothers and sisters also. By
this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and obey his
commandments. (I John 4:7-12, 20-21; 5:2, NRSV)
According to I John, love is from God and was revealed to man in the sacrifice of Jesus
Christ in the crucifixion. Love, first and foremost, is not that humans express love for God but
that God first demonstrated his love towards humanity through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. As
Douglas Hicks puts it: "God's equal love is extended universally-as

equal love for all people"

(2000, 153). The obligation to love one's neighbor is thus a response to this demonstration of
equal love by God in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. At root, much as God expressed love through
giving, genuine Christian love that follows suit is demonstrated through giving. Thus, Christian
biblical doctrine can ground the physician's social obligations in the responsibility to
demonstrate love for one's neighbor via giving and in response to God's demonstration oflove.
But to whom, exactly, must the Christian demonstrate love? In other words, who is one's
neighbor, or how big is one's "neighborhood"?

Equal regard
Christian love expressed as love for God and love for neighbor is often referred to in
Christian circles by the Greek word agape. One of Gene Outka's four distinguishing
characteristics of agape or Christian love is that of equal regard (1967, 9-24). As Gene Outka
defines agape, it is ''a regard for the neighbor which in crucial respects is independent and
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unalterable. To these features there is a corollary: the regard is for every person qua human
existent, to be distinguishedfrom those special traits, actions, etc., which distinguishparticular
personalities from each other" (1967, 9). In other words, agape as Christian love is extensive in
its regard for every person as a human being rather than regard for any person in particular.
Thus, there is a sense of the equality of all humans before God that must be evident in a
demonstrationof agape.
With respect to the condition of equal regard, in Inequality and ChristianEthics Douglas
Hicks writes, "The proper response to God's gratuitousacts of love is to be in solidaritywith
human beings, all of whom are equals" (2000, 160). Thus, echoing I John's interpretationof
agape, agape is a response to God's gift in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and is properly
demonstratedas impartial solidaritywith all human beings who are inherentlyequal.
As Douglas Hicks further adds, uHow Christiansinterpret the 'meaning' of equality is
closely related to a wider theological question: what kind of involvementshould Christianshave
in the 'world's problems'?" (2000, 85). Many theologiansand ethicists disagree about how
Christianityshould look in the twenty-firstcentury. Some promote a Christianitythat focuses on
loving God without being side-trackedby the cares of the world, whereas others promote a
Christianitythat is actively engaged in transformingthe world through its beliefs (Hicks, 2000,
85). Such beliefs might cause one to think that 'neighbor' in the context of the love
commandmentsmeans somethingrelatively narrow (although perhaps somewhatbroader today
given the effects of globalization).However,the concept of equal regard emphasizingthe
extensive nature of agape suggests otherwise.
Furthermore, another look at the parable of the Good Samaritan discussed in chapter four
of this thesis on compassion is particularlyhelpful in supporting an understandingof an

extensive moral circle of concern. The parable of the Good Samaritan emphasizes that
appropriate fulfillment of the commandment to love one's neighbor is evidenced in helping other
individuals in need, not because they are of the same faith, but because they are also part of
humanity.

Theparable of the good Samaritan: Who is my neighbor?
The parable of the Good Samaritan found in the canonical gospel of Luke follows Jesus
Christ's description of the love commandments (Luke 10:25-37, NRSV). This same parable,
which follows below, is Jesus' response to the question posed by the lawyer in the record,
namely, "Who is my neighbor?"
A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell into the hands of robbers,
who stripped him, beat him, and went away, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a
priest was going down that road; and when he saw he passed by on the other side. So
likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side.
But a Samaritan while traveling came near him; and when he saw him, he was moved
with pity. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, having poured oil and wine on
them. Then he put him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took care of him.
The next day he took out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and said, 'Take care of
him; and when I come back, I will repay you whatever more you spend.'
Luke 10:30-35 (NRSV)
When asked which of the three was neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of robbers, the
lawyer asserts that it was "the one who showed mercy," in other words, the Samaritan (Luke
10:36, NRSV). Jesus exhorts the lawyer to emulate the actions of the one who showed mercy by
telling him to "Go and do likewise" (Luke 10:37b, NRSV). Jesus' exhortation affirms that it was
the actions of the Samaritan in the parable that correctly demonstrate the answer to the question,
"Who is my neighbor?" What made the Samaritan place the man by the side of the road into his
own circle of concern was not commonality of religion, race or interest, but the fact that the

individual was also human. Simply put, the man fallen into the hands of robbers was the
Samaritan's neighbor by virtue of his humanity.
Given Jesus Christ's proclamation of the love commandments as well as his illustration
of the commandments in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Christianity can ground the social
obligations of physicians in the duty to define their neighborhood extensively and to demonstrate
love therein.
Kant and Christian love

A closer analysis of Kant and his views on Christian love allows for other Kantian
considerations beyond defining religion as a heteronomous influence. Religion does indeed exert
a heteronomous influence on duty because it allows for actions to be completed in accord with
duty rather than allowing reason alone to determine one's duty. But beyond the manner in which
the Christian duty to love one's Qeighbor is acquired, this duty is not unlike the Kantian
meritorious duty to help others. As Ronald Green points out in his article "Kant on Christian
Love," Kant sometimes equates the second commandment of neighbor-love with the idea of
benevolence or beneficence (1992, 261 ). It is not that Kant disagrees that individuals have an
obligation to love their neighbor. It is simply that Kant respects this duty as derived from reason
and not from religious tradition or a higher being. As Green points out: "Christian love for Kant
represents an injunction to the most perfect fulfillment of rationally understood moral duty"
(1992, 264). In other words, the formulation of Christian precepts as pure and uncompromising
is not unlike the Kantian ideal of consistent, 'rationally understood moral duty' that guides action
despite inclination. Therefore, to the extent that religion supports the rational fulfillment of moral
duty, there may be room for the Christian conception of neighborly love in a Kantian framework.

In Kant's discussion of the Christian duty to love one's neighbor, he interprets this love
as residing in the will and not in the predilection of feeling. With respect to the first love
commandment, Kant points out that love of God cannot be motivated by the senses because God
cannot be physically perceived (Green, 1992, 265). Thus. the duty to love God is not emotionally
motivated but rather rationally grounded in the fulfillment of a commandment. In the same
manner, the love commandment to love one's neighbor as oneself cannot logically refer to a love
dependent upon feeling. The Kantian fundamental belief that 'ought implies can' means that "the
command to love the neighbor, understood as a command to develop feelings of compassion or
concern, would be nonsensical-like

a command to enjoy food or music that one finds

distasteful" (Green, 1992, 263). An understanding of love of neighbor linked to compassionate
feeling or concern is nonsensical for Kant because emotion cannot be commanded. For example,
love as an inclination cannot be commanded, for we do not have control over who we are
inclined to love. In part for this reason, Kant does not base the moral worth of actions on innate
characteristics that motivate. Whether or not I feel sympathy or love for an individual is not in
my control. We can only be obligated to do what is indeed possible to do via reasoned action.
Therefore in applying Kant's conception of 'ought versus can,' neighborly love is not "a matter
of sentiment" but rather "a practical commitment to forms of conducf' (Green, 1992, 265).
This reasoned interpretation of Christian love according to Kantian thought ensures that
the application of the duty to love one's neighbor exerts a normative pull on the rational actor.
Rather than neighborly love simply motivating an individual out of compassion to act, Kant
distinguishes commitment to duty, in this case certain "forms of conduct,' as the constant
determination of moral worth (Green, 1992, 265).

It may be the case that the Kantian version of Christianlove lacks the richness of
interpretationsthat highlightother-regardingfeelings in the expressionof Christian love, or the
derivative nature of neighborlylove as a demonstrationof love for God. After all, Kant's
interpretationof neighbor-lovepromotesbeneficenceas reasoned moral action rather than otherregarding feeling. Such a Kantian view of motivationdiscountsthe moral worth of
compassionatemotivationsthat may stem from religiousbeliefs. Additionally,Kant eliminates
the vertical element of a relationshipwith God that informs agape. Essentially,Kant does not
accept any significantcontributionof love of God in informingthe horizontalrealm of the
ethical (Green, 1992,265).
Though Kant appreciatesthe morally imperativenature of Christianprinciples,he does
not consider religious beliefs to be morally motivatingany more than compassionor self-interest
is morally motivating.But within the category of actionsperformed in accordancewith duty, can
religious motivationshold moral worth? Does religiousmotivationmotivate individualsto act in
a way that duty alone cannot? Consider,again, the parable of the Good Samaritan.
Religious motivation

Interestingly,the parable of the Good Samaritanopens by pointing out that two religious
leaders, a priest (a high religious leader among the Jews) and a Levite (the designatedlayassociateof the priest), failed to demonstrateneighborlylove (New Oxford AnnotatedBible,
NT98). It is the third passer-by, the foreign Samaritanwho was not expectedto have
compassionupon the Jews, who demonstratesneighborlylove by caring for the harmed
individual. So it turns out an extensivemoral circle of concern is evident in the actions of
someone outside the Judean religious circle, and that Jesus Christ is further praisingthese actions
as exemplary even though they are not founded in a love for God.

The parable of the Good Samaritan also highlights the weakness of duty broadly
understood to motivate individualsto act, a weakness discussed in chapter four of this thesis on
compassionatemotivation. Though the Levite and the priest had a religious duty to love their
neighbor, neither was motivated to do so in this situation.Thus, one could equally say that
religious duty exhibits the same weakness. From Jesus Christ's meaning of the parable to the
lawyer, it is clear that the individual who demonstrateslove for neighbor in such a situation is
worthy of praise and that his actions ought to be emulated by the Christian. In other words, a
proper conception of the duty to love one's neighbor in such a situation morally requires the
Christian to stop to provide help. Jesus Christ's parable points out the failure of the Levite and
the priest to act in contrast to the Samaritan's compassionateactions. Though there is no
indication that the Samaritan felt a religious duty to help the man by the side of the road, he was
motivated out of compassionto provide assistance while the religious leaders were not.
But why, exactly, was religious duty not a strong enough motivator to inspire the Levite
or the priest to demonstrate love for neighbor? Did these leaders wrongly believe that their duty
to love their neighbor did not require them to help the man in this situation? Or did these leaders
properly conceptualizetheir duty to help and simultaneouslyfeel unmotivated to act? In other
words, what caused the Levite and the priest to decide that they should not stop to help the man
by the roadside?
Perhaps these leaders of the Judean faith assessed that they had more importantthings to
be doing with their time and other strict duties to fulfill that took precedence over such a tragedy
(Darley and Batson, 1973).In a Kantian sense, they may have recognized a broad duty to love
theit neighbor, in this case demonstratedby helping the individual, and yet determinedthat they
did not need to fulfill this duty at this time, in this manner and with respect to this individual. In

such a situation, motivations outside duty such as compassion or self-interest must motivate the
individual who commits actions of moral worth to direct him insofar as how he is to fulfill his
duty.
On the other hand, the priest and the Levite may have believed, and wrongly so according
to Jesus Christ's interpretation of the love commandments, that their other responsibilities made
them exempt from such a duty to act. As Terry Price writes in his work Understanding Ethical

Failures in Leadership, these religious leaders may have thought of themselves as different from

.

followers by virtue of righteousness; they may have determined that some important business
they were on their way to carry out justified not stopping to provide assistance; or they may have
determined that they were bound to religious norms that would cause them to be concerned about
coming into contact with a half-dead person (Hoyer and McDaniel, 1990, 327). In any event, for
all of these hypothetical cases, religiosity effectively prevented the Levite and the priest from
helping this individual in need.
The negative influence of religion on action seen in this parable raises an interesting
point. Like Kant's emphasis on the rational agent who reasons through his duties and is
motivated by reason, reason ought to hold weight in the determination of morally worthy actions.
Given that religious beliefs are not derived from Kantian reason, the appropriate fulfillment of
religious duties still requires reason, in much the same way that application of Kant's categorical
imperatives requires reason. Though we might be able to fulfill religious duty without reason in
the same way that compassionate action could cause an individual to fulfill Kantian duty, we
sometimes need reason to interpret duty in either case. Religious principles must be applied by
rational agents who reason through their actions rather than basing those actions solely on
tradition or the societal role in which they find themselves. Religious action must occur in a

culture of ethical criticism in which beliefs are questionedto the extent that the essence of the
belief may be re-examined,with the result being a metamorphosisof the belief or a re-embracing
of the more richly understood belief.
But even if religious actions are to be reasoned through in a culture of ethical and selfcriticism, can religious beliefs also serve as morally worthy motivationin the fulfillment of duty?
The parable of the Good Samaritan seems to support the notion that religion is not a strong
motivationalfactor in fulfilling the duty to love one's neighbor as oneself. After all, the Levite
and the priest who ought to have expressedgreat love for God under the Old TestamentLaw
were not subsequentlymotivated to demonstratelove for neighbor by caring for the man in this
situation. In contrast, though the Samaritan is not motivated out of a love for God, it is he who is
moved with pity or compassionto provide assistance to the man.
Consider some empirical data on the role of religious motivation in inspiring physicians
to provide charity care. A study published in 2000 by Eliason et al. explored the connection
between physicians' personal values and the amount of service to the underservedthey provide,
Results of the study indicatedthat 52% of the 712 physicians who respondedprovide over 40%
of their care to the underserved(defined as Medicare, Medicaid or uninsured patients) (Eliason et
al., 2000, 229). With regards to the motivationof these physicians, findings provided general
support for the hypothesisthat self-transcendentvalues such as universalism(defined as
"motivation to enhance and protect all people") and benevolence(defined as "motivationto help
those close to you"} are rated higher by physicianswho extend care to the indigent (Eliason et
al., 2000, 231}. In other words, self-transcendentvalues includemotivations which are extensive
or impartial (i.e. universalism)and motivationswhich are partial (i.e. benevolence).Kant would
encourage such benevolent actions, and would further support their moral worth to the extent

that they were motivated out of duty. The research study also indicated that tradition, defined as
a "desire to maintain customs and religion," was the only value significantly associated with care
to the underserved (Eliason et al., 2000, 229). The results of this study suggest that many
physicians who continue to fulfill social obligations by providing charity care also significantly
value religion. However, this study does not provide any evidence for causation between
religious motivation and the provision of charity care.
Consider also the motivations of surveyed physician volunteers at CrossOver Ministry
who engage in a community effort to provide compassionate, quality health care to the
uninsured. As the mission statement of Crossover Ministry emphasizes, the physicians who
volunteer their medical services at this organization are "Providing health care, promoting
wellness and connecting the talents and resources of the community with those in need in the
name of Jesus Christ." The centrality of religious belief to the mission of this free clinic is
exemplary of many free clinics in the United States. Perhaps not surprisingly, over 90% of the
medical professionals who choose to volunteer their services at such a religiously-driven
organization identified themselves as religious, and over 85% of all participants as Christian.
Empirical data from surveys of volunteers at Crossover Ministry indicate that physicians were
significantly more likely to identify compassion as the motivating factor in their volunteerism
above the other motivations of duty, self-interest and religious motivation. Furthermore, religious
motivation was not rated significantly different from the motivations of duty or self-interest.
Though the sample is highly religious and strongly motivated by compassion, the results of this
study do not support a causal connection between religious motivation and medical
volunteerism.

It may be problematic to generalize the findings of the dominance of compassion in
inspiring charity care in the CrossOver Ministry study given the high percentage of physicians
who identify themselves religiously. It may be that religious beliefs are inspiring compassionate
action , or it may just be that physicians who provide charity care regardless of religious
background are often motivated out of compassion tt> act. From these two studies, it seems that
while religion may serve as grounds for the social obligations of many physicians who identify
themselves religiously , religious belief may or may not directly motivate the fulfillment of social
obligations . But given the correlation between religion and charity care established in both of
these studies, are their ways that religion can be instrumental towards inspiring other morally
worthy motivations such as self-interest or compassion?

Religiousbeliefand self-interest
In considering the connection between religion and self-interest, can religious beliefs
contribute to morally worthy self-interested motivations that inspire people to act? At a most
basic level, Christian tradition might motivate an individual to act out of a concern for future
rewards in the after-life. Such actions would be self-interested (and selfish by Plato's account,
for such motivation is in line with Plato's conception of the selfish motivation of honor) . But
beyond such motivations focused on the future, the individual of Christian faith may be
motivated to engage in actions that sustain her identity as a Christian. In this case, motivation to
engage in helping behavior would be supported by religious beliefs that are instrumental to the
self-interested concept of Christian identity. Much as with the morally worthy self-interested
actions of physicians providing charity care because it is their role as physicians, religious
traditions could support volunteerism as an integral part of religious identity .

But what makes up religious identity, and more specifically, Christian identity? With its
historical roots and living traditions, Christianity carries with it a collection of narrative stories
and draws upon memory and community in its practice of faith. Narratives as found in the pages
of the Bible as well as in the sketches of personal accounts of past and present believers link the
moral tradition to the experiences of flesh and bones. As Hervieu-Leger writes with respect to
religion and memory, the group defines itself"as a lineage of belief' (2000, 125). Thus, to be
Christian means to become part of a historical lineage of faith, to have one's identity linked to
the many who have come before and the many who will come after.
But what are the implications for motivation when one's duty is linked to a community
identity? As K wame Appiah writes, "if an identity is yours, it may determine certain acts of
solidarity as valuable, or be an internal part of the specification of your satisfactions and
enjoyments, or motivate and give meaning to acts of supererogatory kindness" (2005, 25). As
Appiah elucidates, identity might be linked to solidarity with other individuals who are part of
the same group, it may determine happiness for an individual, and it may motivate and provide
meaning behind actions of benevolence. So it appears that religious identity can motivate actions
in a way that duty cannot. As Appiah further writes: "To adopt an identity, to make it mine, is to
see it as structuring my way through life" (2005, 24). Identity can serve as a pattern for moral
action, linking one's own actions to the identity of the group and thereby adding the dimension
of accountability. Particularly for Christians living in Christian community, there is a sense in
which they are accountable both to God and to their fellow Christians to uphold the expectations
of the group in their actions. While such accountability should be secondary to the role of reason
in determining duty, accountability could motivate individuals to perform the morally worthy
action even when their account of duty may be misconceptualized.

To be a Christian carries with it an identity that does not follow from other motivations of
duty, self-interest and compassion. Believers harbor an understanding of what it means to be a
Christian, and their actions can be motivated based on their desire to "be Christian." To the
extent that they identify themselves as such, their actions to help others become part of their own
identity and thus intrinsically linked to who they are as individuals in the company of society,
and specifically as part of Christian community. Participation in Christian community sustains
this identity. As Halbwachs writes, "Even when they correspond to and express the present, the
ideas of society are always embodied in persons or groups" ( 1925, 188). The embodiment of
religious tradition in the context of a community of believers offers the opportunity to develop
human relationships that may sustain and encourage moral practice in a way that duty alone
cannot.

If religious tradition, and specifically Christianity, is to inspire helping acts by promoting
the self-interested motivation of identity, one must ask: what does it mean to be a Christian? The
traditions of this faith and Christian community sustain such conceptions in a way that Kantian
duty alone cannot. In applying Kant's categorical imperatives, one might be able to assert that
one engages in the fulfillment of duty in order to be identified as a rational agent who determines
morality by reason. Though such a motivation would, of course, be un-Kantian, it is possible to
conceive of an identity focused on Kant's identification of reason as supreme. One could apply
Plato's conception of justice to determine that one wanted to be identified as a just person.
Though these conceptions of identity may be firmly routed in the establishment of morally
worthy character traits, they are not connected to community in the way that religious
identification is. It may be that religious communities enhance personal identity in a way that

duty cannot, thereby motivating individuals to act out of self-interest to preserve that identity.
Consider also, the role of compassion in religious beliefs.

Religious belief and compassion
When [Jesus] went ashore, he saw a great crowd; and he had compassion for them and
cured their sick. (Matthew 14: 14, NRSV)
This particular account of Jesus Christ's healing of the sick is representative of many
accounts in the canonical gospels in which Jesus Christ was motivated out of compassion to act.
Given the strong relationship between religious identification and volunteerism established in
both the empirical study of physicians at Crossover Ministry and the study by Eliason et al., how
can reasoned religious beliefs motivate individuals to act out of compassion?
One interpretation of the grounding of Christian neighborly love is that obedience to God
grounds actions that fulfill this duty while compassion motivates. As Edmund Pellegrino and
David Thomasma clearly state in The Christian virtues in medical practice, while the Christian
must recognize that compassion is not an exclusive value of the Christian community, the
distinct manifestation of Christian compassion is rooted first and foremost in what Pellegrino and
Thomasma take to be a desire to be obedient to a loving heavenly father ( 1996, 87). But beyond
the duty to demonstrate compassion as love for one's neighbor, is there a way in which religious
beliefs can ground compassion within the limits of respect which Martha Nussbaum calls for?
As discussed in chapter four of this thesis on compassion, in Compassion and terror,
Martha Nussbaum identifies the partiality of compassion as its primary weakness. In addressing
this critique of compassion, Nussbaum suggests extending the moral circle of compassion within
the limits of respect. Chapter four appeals to the Kantian conception of duty as one framework
within which compassion can hold moral worth. A similar appeal to agape and its quality of

equal regard could support the Christianconceptionof duty as neighborlylove as a basis for
extendingthis moral circle of concern.
In a demonstrationof agape, an extensiveconcernfor all persons qua humans must be
evident as Gene Outka and DouglasHicks pinpoint.This demonstrationof equal regard, first
evident in God's love for humanityand next striven for by the Christianbeliever, is indicativeof
solidaritywith all human beings. Particularlyin the Christiantradition, a sense of a shared past
as Paul writes in his letter to the Ephesianscan increase feelingsof solidaritywith others: "You
were... by nature children of wrath, like everyoneelse. But God, who is rich.in mercy, out of the
great love with which he loved us even when we were dead through trespasses,made us alive
together with Christ-by grace you have been saved" (Ephesians2: 1, 3-5, NRSV). Christianity
recognizesthe beginningof every human being as a fallen state, as well as God's unmerited,
divine favor bestowedon humanityin the form of his grace. Compassioninspiredby Christian
beliefs may evaluate all of humanity as sharing in the same vulnerabilitiesand therebyelicit a
judgment high in similar possibilities(see c~apterfour on compassionfor a discussionof
Nussbaum's four categoriesof judgment in elicitingcompassion).Furthermore,the fundamental
recognition of God's demonstrationof compassiondespite a lack of deservingnesson the part of
humanity can ground the believer's demonstrationof compassion.As I John later corroborates:
"We love becausehe first loved us" (I John 4:19, NRSV). If God loved despite shortcomingsand
irrespectiveof merit, the Christian's demonstrationof compassionin relationshipswith others is
grounded in the emulation of God's extensivelove.
Such religious doctrinethat groundsa demonstrationof agape in a wide moral circle of
concern can inform the rational agent's demonstrationof compassion.It may be that such
Christian notions of equal regard and divine grace actually inform believers' demonstrationof

compassion, thereby extending their circle of moral concern and making them more likely to act
out of compassion in situations of need.

Striving/or the unattainable
Though Kantian thought insists that 'ought implies can' and thus that what is moral must
also be attainable, religious ideals are often fraught with the expectation of un-attainability.
Particularly with Christian thought, the very fact that God bestowed grace upon humanity is
indicative of the fact that humans will not always act morally, or in Christian terms, all humans
will sin. Again, the parable of the Good Samaritan highlights this human nature in demonstrating
that individuals of faith are not always the best at demonstrating love or compassion. The parable
in this religious context emphasizes the need to recognize neighborly love regardless of who
might be demonstrating it, and to strive to demonstrate love with the humble attitude that one is
not always perfect at it. This chapter finds that the demonstration of neighborly love in the
fulfillment of social obligations by both non-Christian and Christian physicians alike is of great
moral worth. Not only can religious beliefs inspire the fulfillment of Kantian duty in so far as
they tell people the right thing to do, religion can also motivate individuals to act out of a selfinterested desire to maintain their identity or out of extensive compassion.
Significant motivations must drive humans to strive for the 'unattainable.' As Green
states with regard to Christian love as an impossible possibility, in essence Kant says:
because of the unyielding stringency of its demand for full moral obedience, the love
commandment provides a stimulating challenge to the moral life. The Matthean
commandment, he states, presents an "ideal of holiness" so perfect that it is "unattainable
by any creature." Nevertheless, in this very purity, the commandment is an "archtype
which we should strive to approach and to imitate in uninterrupted infinite progress."
(1992, 266)

Indeed, as religious communities sustain the formation of Christian identity and biblical doctrine
places compassion within the limits of respect, the duty to love one's neighbor provides a worthy
goal for the rational agent.
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Conclusion: What are morally worthy motivationsfor physiciansfulfilling social obligations?
Health is a fundamentalrequirementfor the fulfillmentof the human potential... [as well
as] freedom to act and direct one's life.
-Edmund Pellegrino (1999, 248)
As physicianselevate the health of their communities,they are helping to ensure
preconditionsfor the rationalityof all agents. Physicians' use of their medical skills beyond the
contractual relationshipswith their patients continuesto be integral towards the end of healthy
communities, and particularly so in a capitalisticsociety where health care access is based on
ability to pay. The non-contractualinteractionsof physicianswith their communitiescontribute
towards a minimum standard of health for members of society. Whether physiciansare providing
charity care to individuals who cannot afford it or increasingthe quality of medical care
available to all individualsthrough such actions as training the next generationof physicians or
directing public policy, their actions elevate the public health. This baseline of health enables
individualsto thrive as they pursue their own projects. As individualsflourish, society in tum
flourishes.
Beyond establishingthe grounds of physicians' social obligations,this thesis has focused
on the moral question of motivation:bow should physiciansbe motivatedto fulfill social
obligations? Beginning with Immanuel Kant's Foundationsof the metaphysicsof morals (1969),

this thesis found that actions committed out of a sense of duty are of great moral worth.
However, in contrast to Kant's conceptionof the moral worth of motivationsoutside of duty, this
thesis further argued that the moral worth of duty does not preclude the moral worth of other
motivations. Specifically,this thesis explored the moral worth of motivationssuch as selfinterest, compassion and religious motivationthat inspire actions in accord with duty. In
discussing the moral worth of self-interestedmotivations,this thesis drew from Plato's Republic

(1993) to determine that self-interested motivations that are not selfish can have moral worth.
Based upon Martha Nussbaum's Compassion and terror (2003), this thesis also found that
compassion extensively applied is a morally worthy motivation. Finally, this thesis looked at the
moral worth of religious motivation using the specific example of Christian motivation. The
thesis explored the value of religious motivation in inspiring individuals to act out of the morally
worthy motivations of self-interest and compassion. Specifically, this thesis found that religious
motivation is morally worthy in its ability to sustain self-interested motivations based on
religious identity as well as its ability to inspire extensive compassion. The empirical study at
Crossover Ministry described in this thesis found that physicians are predominately motivated
by compassion. The moral worth of compassion as determined by this thesis indicates that the
actions of these medical professionals are morally worthy .
Often in fulfilling the broad duty to help others, individuals are motivated to act in a
certain place, in a certain manner and for a particular person for many different reasons. As
defined in this thesis, to the extent that physicians are motivated to fulfill their social obligations
out of duty, self-interest, compassion or religious motivation, their actions are morally worthy.
But how does the moral worth of each of these motivations compare? Is duty of greater
moral worth than the rest, or is some other motivation of the greatest moral worth? Or is there a
plateau of moral worth above which all motivations are equally moral? Additional comparisons
among the four motivations discussed in this thesis must be drawn in order to answer these
questions.
Furthermore, though this thesis framed religious motivation in the context of its
relationship to self-interest and compassion, one might further ask: is religious motivation of
intrinsic moral worth to the fulfillment of social obligations? And is there really room for pure

religious motivation in a Kantian framework?Where is the balance between autonomy and
heteronomy? Can religious motivation be autonomous,or are precepts derived from Christian
community inevitably heteronomous?For example, there may be a sense in which religious
individuals can be strengthened by moral discussionswithin a religious community while still
maintaining an autonomous frame of reference from which to determine moral action. Further
exploration of the role of religious motivation in the fulfillment of social obligations is a topic for
future study.
Finally, the fact that there was no significant difference between the motivations of duty,
self-interest or religious motivation in the CrossOverMinistry empirical study highlights the
complexities of motivation behind human action. Though this thesis separated the motivations of
duty, self-interest,compassionand religious motivation in order to determine their individual
moral worth, the many connectionsbetween these motivations are indicative of this larger truth.
Individuals are motivated to fulfill social obligations for many reasons, and it may be that
motivations working in concert add another dimension to the picture of moral worth. Ultimately,
an interest in how physicians should be motivated to fulfill social obligationsmust recognize the
complexities inherent in motivationswhich inspire individuals to act

Bibliography
Aaronson, W.E., Zinn, J.S., & Rosko, M.D. (1994). Do for-profit and not-for-profit nursing
homes behave differently? Gerontologist, 34(6), 775-786.
Arrow, K.J. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic
Review, 53(5), 941-973.
Batson, C. D., Ahma~ N., & Tsang, J. (2002). Four motives for community involvement.
Journal of Social Issues, 58(3), 429-446. Retrieved October 19, 2005, from Expanded
Academic Index.
Ben-Ner, A. (1986). Nonprofit organizations: Why do they exist in market economies?
In S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.), The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and
policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bennett, J. (1974). The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn. Philosophy, 49,123-134.
Boubulian, P.J., Pickens. S.S., & Anderson, R.J. (2004). Managing the in-between through
servant leadership.
In N.S. Huber and J.T. Wren (eds.), Building leadership bridges 2004 (pp.70-84).
International Leadership Association.
Brown, M. T. (2005). Corporate integrity: Rethinking organizational ethics and leadership.
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, A.E., & Brock, D. W. ( 1990). Deciding for others: The ethics of surrogate decision
making. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Buchmueller, T.C., & Feldstein, P.J. (1996). Hospital community benefits other than charity
care: Implications for tax exemption and public policy. Hospital & Health Services
Administration, 41(4), 461-471.
Burns, J.M. (1978). Leadership. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Burns, J.M. (2003). Transforming leadership. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
Campbell, D. M. (1982). Doctors, lawyers, ministers: Christian ethics in professional
practice. Nashville: Abingdon.
Childress, J. F., & Fletcher, J.C. (1994, May-June). Respect for autonomy.
In Individualism and community: The contested terrain of autonomy (pp.34-35). Hastings
Center Report.
Churchill, L.R. (1987). Rationing health care in America: Perceptions and principles of justice.
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Clary, E.G., Snyder, M., Ridge, R.D., Copeland, J., Stukas, A.A., Haugen, J., & Miene, P.
( 1998). Understanding and assessing the motivations of volunteers: A functional approach.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1516-1530.
Connolly, C. (2006, March 23). Proportion of doctors giving charity care declines. The
Washington Post, p.A09.
Connolly, T. (2004, February 18). Safety net: Invest in free clinics for a healthier Virginia The
Richmond Times Dispatch, p.Al 7.
Couto, R. A. (2002). To give their gifts: Health, community, and democracy. Nashville:
Vanderbilt University Press.
Couto, R.A. (1993). Community Health as Social Justice: Lessons on Leadership.
Crossover Ministry: Compassionate Health Care for People in Need. Annual Report 2003.
Culler, S.D .• & Ohsfeldt, R. L. (1986, Winter). The determinates of the provision of charity
medical care by physicians. Journal of Human Resources, 21, 135-156.

Dagi, T. F. (1988, Spring/Summer). Physicians and obligatory social activism. Th.eJournal of
Medical Humanities and Bioethics, 9(1 ), 50-59.
Darley, J.M., & Batson, C.D. (1973). 'From Jerusalem to Jericho': A study of situational and
dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27,
101.
DeNavas-Walt, C., Proctor, B.D., & Lee, C.H. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports,
P60-229. (2005). Income, poverty and health insurance coverage in the United States: 2004.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved April 19, 2006 from
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf.
E-1.001 Principles of Medical Ethics. AMA Code of Medical Ethics. American Medical
Association: Helping Doctors Help Patients. Retrieved October I 0, 2005 from
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/ p ub/category/2498.html.
Eliason, B.C., Guse, C., & Gottlieb, M.S. (2000). Personal values of family physicians,
practice satisfaction, and service to the underserved. Arch Fam Med, 9(3), 228-232.
Emanuel, E. J. (1991 ). The ends of human life: Medical ethics in a liberal polity. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Erde, E. L., & Jones, A.H. (1983). Diminished capacity, friendship, and medical paternlism: Two
case studies from fiction. Theoretical Medicine, 4, 303-322.
Farmer, Paul. (2005, May). 15 minutes: Paul Farmer-Founder, Partners in Health .
In Stanford Social Innovation Review.
Field, M.G. (1961 ). The doctor-patient relationship in the perspective of ' fee-for-serve' and
'third-party' medicine. Journal of Health and Human Behavior, 2(4), 252-262.
Fletcher, J. (1972). Morals and medicine: The moral problems of' The patient's right to know
the truth; contraception; artificial insemination; sterilization; euthanasia . Boston: Beacon
Press.
Geiger, H.J. (1957). Social responsibility of the physician. The Scientific Monthly, 85(2), 89-94.
Geller, S., Taylor, B.M., & Scott, H.D. (2004). Free clinics helping to patch the safety net.
Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 15(1), 42-51.
Geraghty, K. (2005). The obligation to provide charity care. American Medical Association
(Virtual Mentor). Retrieved May 13, 2005 from
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/categorv/6567.html.
Glover, J. (1999). Humanity: A moral history of the twentieth century. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press.
Goldman, A.H. (1980). The moral foundations of professional ethics. Totowa: Rowman
and Littlefield.
Greenleaf, R. K. (1977). Servant leadership: Ajourney into the nature of legitimate power and
greatness. New York: Paulist Press.
Gruen , R. L., Pearson, S. D., & Brennan, T.A. (2004). Physician-citizens-Public
roles and professional obligations. JAMA, 29(1 ), 94-98.
Harrelson, W. (1951 ). The idea of agape in the New Testament. The Journal of Religion, 31,
169-182.
Heifetz, R.A. (1994). Leadership without easy answers. Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press.
Hervieu-Leger, D. (2000). Religion as a chain of memory. New Jersey: Rutgers University.
Hicks, D.A. (2000). Inequality and Christian Ethics. United Kingdom: Cambridge University
Press.

Hicks, D. A. (2005, Spring). Self-interest, deprivation, and agency: Expanding the capabilities
approach. The Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, 25(1), 147-167.
Himmelstein, D.U., Woolhandler, S., Hellander, I., & Wolfe, S.M. (1999). Quality of care in
investor-owned vs. not-for-profit HMOs. JAMA, 282(2), 159-163.
Holleman, W. L., Edwards, D. C., & Matson, C.C. (1994, Summer). Obligations of physicians
to patients and third-party payers. The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 5(2), 113-120.
Hoyer, S. & McDaniel, P. (1990). From Jericho to Jerusalem: The good Samaritan from a
different direction. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 18, 326-333.
Irvin, R.A. (2000). Quality of care differences by ownership in United States renal dialysis
facilities. ASA IO Journal, 46(6), 775-778.
James, D. N. The friendship model: A reply to Illingworth. Bioethics, 3(2), 142-146.
Kant, I. (1969). Foundations of the metaphysics of morals.
In R.P. Wolf(ed.) & L.W. Beck (trans.), Kant: Foundations of the metaphysics of morals: text
and critical essays, (pp.3-94). New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
Kidder, T. (2003). Mountains beyond mountains: The quest of Dr. Paul Farmer, a man who
would cure the world. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Komrad, M. S. (1983). A defence of medical paternalism: maximixing patients' autonomy.
Journal of medical ethics, 9, 38-44.
Koslowski, P. (1999). Ethics and the Art of Medicine.
In I. Km;uradi (ed.), Ethics of the professions: Medicine, business, media, law (pp.19-35).
New York: Springer.
Lasagna, L. (1964). Hippocratic Oath-Modem version. Academic Dean of the School of
Medicine at Tufts University.
Lofland, J., & Lofland, L.H. (1995). Analyzing social settings: A guide to qualitative
observation and analysis. US: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Marketos, S.G., Diamandopoulos, A.A., Bartsocas, C.S., Poulakou-Rebelakou, E., & Koutras,
D.A. (1996). The Hippocratic Oath. The Lancet, 347(8994), 101-102.
May, W.F. (1983). Notes on the ethics of doctors and lawyers.
In B. Baumrin and B. Freedman (eds.), Moral Responsibility and the Professions (pp.93-125).
US: Haven Publ'ications.
May, W.F. (2000). The physicians' covenant: Images of the healer in medical ethics. Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press.
May, W.F. (2003). Beleaguered rulers: The public obligation of the professional. Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press.
Miles, S.H. (2004). The Hippocratic oath and the ethics of medicine. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Gorovitz, S., Jameton, A.L., Macklin, R., O'Connor, J.M., Perrin. E.V., St. Clair, P.B., &
Sherwin, S.(eds.) (1976). Moral problems in medicine. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Murray, T. H. (1994, May-June). Communities need more than autonomy.
In Individualism and community: The contested terrain of autonomy (pp.32-33). Hastings
Center Report.
Metzger, B.M., & Murphy, R.E. (eds). (1991). The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised
Standard Version. New York: Oxford University Press.
Needleman, J. (2001). The role of nonprofits in health care. Journal of Health Politics, Policy
and Law, 26(5), 1113-1130.
Nussbaum, M. (2003, Winter). Compassion and terror. Daedalus, 132(1), 10-26.

Outka, G. (1967). Agape: An ethical analysis. New Haven and London: Yale University
Press.
Pellegrino, E., & Thomasma, D. (1996). The Christian virtues in medical practice.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Pellegrino, E.D. (1983). Towards a reconstructionof medical morality: The primacy of
the act of profession and the fact of illness.
In B. Baumrin & B. Freedman (eds.) Moral responsibility and the professions (pp.179-202).
US: Haven Publications.
Pellegrino, E.D. ( 1999). The commodificationof medical and health care: The moral
consequences of a paradigm shift from a professional to a market ethic. Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy , 24(3), 243-266.
Plato. ( 1984). Euthyphro .
In R.E. Allen (trans.), Volume 1: The dialogues of Plato. Retrieved November 19, 2005 from
http://www.netlibrary.com/summary.asp?id=53098.
Plato. (1993). Republic. R.Waterfield(trans). New York: Oxford University Press.
Plato. (1992). Republic. G.M.A. Grube (trans). C.D.C. Reeve (revised). Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company.
Povar, G.J., Blumen, H., Daniel, J., Daub, S., Evans L., Holm, R.P., Levkovich, N., McCarter,
A.O., Sabin, J., Snyder, L., Sulmasy, D., Vaughan, P., Wellikson, L.D., & Campbell, A.
(2004). Ethics in practice: Managed care and the changing health care environment.Ann
Intern Med, 141, 131-136.
Price, T. L. & Hicks, D.A. A framework for a general theory ofleadership ethics.
In G.R. Goethals & G. Sorenson (eds.), A quest/or a general theory of leadership: A
multidisciplinary experiment. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.
Price, T. (2003). The ethics of authentic transfonnational leadership. The Leadership Quarterly,
14, 67-81.
Price, T. (2006). Understanding ethical failures in leadership. New York: CambridgeUniversity
Press.
Rachels, J. (1986). The elements of moral philosophy. New York: Random House.
In G.J. Agich (ed.) Responsibility in health care. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing
Company, 1982.
Rousseau, J. (1992). The social contract and discourses. London: Guernsey Press Co. Ltd..
75 million people in U.S. uninsured for part of '01-02. USA Today: Health and Behavior.
Posted 3/5/2003. Retrieved November 26, 2005 from
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2003-03-05-uninsuredx.htm.
Shore, B. (2001). The cathedral within : transforming your life by giving something back. New
York: Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Singer, P. (2002). One world: The ethics of globalization. New Haven, CT, US and London, UK:
Yale University Press.
Singer, P. (1999, September 5). The Singer solution to world poverty: A contentious ethicist
explains why your taste for foie gras is starving children. NY Times Magazine.
Starr, P. (1982). The social transformation of American medicine. New York: Basic Books.
Trocchio, J. (1996). What are true community benefits? Health Progress, 77(5), 34-37.

...

Appendix A: Survey of Physicians at Crossover Ministry

Participant Information
How long have you volunteered at CrossOver? _________

_

How many hours a week do you volunteer at CrossOver? __________

_

How many hours a week do you volunteer your medical services outside your commitment to CrossOver?

How do you identify yourself religiously? ____
Are you retired?

Yes

_ ______

_

No

Pleasecategorizeyourpracticeb_ycirclingall that apply:
Rural

Urban

Office-based Patient Care

Suburban
Hospital-based Patient Care

Primary Care

Specialist

If specialist, please describe:_______________

Motivation

to Volunteer

_

Medical Services

Please rate the extent of your agreement with each paragraph using the scale below:
Strongly
Disagree

Dit gree

1

2

~ :;,~ - hat
Jlmirmee
3

Neutral

So~ ewhat

Agree

4

5

6

Strongly
Agree
7

Statement A: "I volunteer my medical services because I believe it is an action valuable in
and of itself. I do it because I should, and not because of the results. Since I expect other
physicians to engage in this type of behavior, I ought to do it too."
Statement B: "I volunteer my medical services because it contributes to my happiness, or it
makes me a better doctor, or it's part of my identity as a physician."
Statement C: "I volunteer ·my medical services because I can really sympathize with the
patients. I am compassionate towards people in need, and I volunteer my services because I am
genuinely concerned about those less fortunate than I."
Statement D: "I volunteer my medical services because God has called me to do so, or
because my faith gives me compassion or a sense of duty to do so. I volunteer because my actions
are a demonstration of God's love."

Please rank the above descriptions in order of the best description of your motivation to
volunteer (1) to the least accurate description (4).
Statement A

Statement B

Statement C

StatementD

100

Please respond to the following statements using the scale below (ifit doesn't apply, leave
blank). Think about what really motivates you the most.
Strongly
D~sagree

Disagree

1

2

ISomew qat_ ,_
Disagree

3

1jl'eutral

I

4

Som;i what
A ree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

5

6

7

I volunteer my medical services ...

1)
2)
3)
4) __

5) __
6)
7) __
8) __
9) __
10) __
11) __
other

... because it's my role as a physician.
... because my faith gives me a sense of compassion.
... just because it's the right thing to do.
... because I enjoy doing it.
... because I care about people.
... because I try to act how I expect everyone else to act.
... because my profession looks highly upon volunteering.
... because I want to express God's love and care in all I say and do.
... because people close to me approve of my volunteering.
... because I feel compassion toward people in need.
... because it would be hypocritical of me not to volunteer given my expectations of

physicians.
... because someone will suffer ifl don't.
13) __
... because Dr. Jannuzzi convinced me to.
14) __
... because my ministry of care for the sick belongs to God.
15) __
... because it makes me a better doctor.
16) __
... because I am concerned about those less fortunate than I.
17) __
... because if I were an uninsured patient, I would want a physician to provide free care
to me.
18) __
... because of the friendships.
19) __
... because my faith gives me a sense of duty to do so.
20) __
... because it's an action valuable in itself.
21) __
... because God has called me to do it.
22) If other, please describe:
12) __

